Professor Gailmard studies the structure and development of American political institutions from a strategic perspective. His research has examined the emergence of political institutions in the English colonial period; expertise and political responsiveness in the bureaucracy; historical development of the American executive branch; the internal organization of the U.S. Congress; and electoral accountability. He has also published on formal political theory and research methods, particularly in historical political economy, and models of rational decision making in groups.
Professor Gailmard is the author of Learning While Governing: Expertise and Accountability in the Executive Branch (with John W. Patty), which won the William H. Riker Prize (APSA political economy section) and Herbert A. Simon Prize (APSA public administration section), as well as Statistical Modeling and Inference for Social Science, a Ph.D.-level textbook. He has published research in leading social science journals, including the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, and Journal of Politics.
PS231A: Quantitative Analysis in Political Research (Ph.D.)
PS232A: Formal Models in Political Science I (Intro. game theory, Ph.D.)
PS232B: Formal Models in Political Science II (Adv. game theory theory, Ph.D.)
PS239: Formal Models of Political Development (Ph.D.)
PS279: Bureaucratic Politics in the U.S. (Ph.D.)
PS3: Introduction to Empirical Analysis and Quantitative Methods (undergraduate)
PS135: Game Theory in the Social Sciences (undergraduate)
Associate Editor, Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy
Editorial Board member, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Journal of Public Policy, Public Administration Review, Perspectives on Public Management and Governance
Co-PI and Co-director, summer institute on Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models, National Science Foundation, 2010-present