

Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley  
Political Science 191 - 3  
Spring 2023  
Prof. Steven Fish  
F 2-4, 202 Social Sciences Bldg.  
Office hours: F 4:30-6:30, 744 Social Sciences Bldg.

## DEMOCRACY'S GLOBAL CRISIS

This seminar investigates the worldwide crisis of democracy and how democracy's defenders might overcome it. In the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, democracy was on a global roll; now it is in retreat in every world region. In the United States, the world's oldest and most influential democracy, one of the two major parties works to restrict voting access and refuses to accept defeat in elections. In Western Europe, democracy remains robust but illiberal parties with dubious democratic commitments have made appreciable gains in elections. India, the world's largest democracy, has come under the control of a figure who pursues an exclusionary, ethnonational agenda. Poland and Hungary, once exemplars of successful democratization, are now dominated by parties that attack judicial independence and free media. Democracy is under threat in Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, the Philippines and other developing-world democracies as well, and authoritarianism has hardened in China, Russia, Venezuela, Burma, and much of the Middle East. How can we explain democracy's crisis? How can democrats reverse the autocratic wave, and what must they do to restore democracy's promise?

Our seminar will focus intensively on discussion of the readings, which must be done in their entirety before each class meeting. All readings are available electronically on the bcourses page. Requirements consist of three exams and attendance and active participation in all seminar meetings. There will be a short quiz on the readings at the beginning of each seminar, with the exception of the first week, when there will not be a quiz. The ten top quiz grades (and only the ten top grades) will count toward the course grade. No quizzes may be made up for any reason. Grades will be determined on a 100-point scale: each of the exams counts for 20 points; attendance and participation in seminar discussions for 30 points; and the quizzes for 10 points.

Use of electronic or internet devices, including laptops and cellphones, is not allowed during class.

Our books for the course are:

Arlie Russell Hochschild, *Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right* (New York: The New Press, 2016).

Peter Pomerantsev, *This Is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War against Reality* (New York: Public Affairs, 2019).

Shashi Tharoor, *The Battle of Belonging: On Nationalism, Patriotism, and What It Means to Be Indian* (New Delhi: Aleph, 2020).

*Syllabus*

**PART I: DEMOCRACY UNDER SIEGE**

Week 1 (January 20): The Setting

Sarah Repucci and Amy Slipowitz, “Freedom in the World, 2022: The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule” (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2022), pp. 1-16.

Larry Diamond, “Democracy’s Arc: From Resurgent to Imperiled,” *Journal of Democracy* 33, 1 (January 2022), pp. 163-179.

Francis Fukuyama, “30 Years of World Politics: What Has Changed?,” *Journal of Democracy* 31, 1 (January 2020), pp. 11-21.

William A. Galston, “The Enduring Vulnerability of Liberal Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy* 31, 3 (July 2020), pp. 8-24.

Anne Applebaum, “The Brutal Alternate World in Which the U.S. Abandoned Ukraine,” *The Atlantic*, December 22, 2022.

Michael Hirsh, “2022: The Year the Good Guys Struck Back,” *Foreign Policy*, December 19, 2022.

Week 2 (January 27): The Erosion of Democracy in the Old Democracies

Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, “Let’s Just Say It: The Republicans Are the Problem,” *Washington Post*, April 27, 2012.

Barton Gellman, “Trump’s Next Coup Has Already Begun,” *The Atlantic*, December 6, 2021.

Julian E. Zelizer, “The Jan. 6 Report Is Out. Now the Real Work Begins,” *New York Times*, December 24, 2022.

Adam B. Schiff, “My Fellow Members of the Jan. 6 Committee and I Don’t Want You to Forget about ‘the Republican Congressmen,’” *New York Times*, December 22, 2022.

Ruth Ben-Ghiat, “Trump, Putin, and the Politics of Domination,” *The New Republic*, April 15, 2022.

David Broder, “The Future is Italy, and It’s Bleak,” *New York Times*, July 22, 2022.

Maiko Ichihara, “Japanese Democracy after Shinzo Abe,” *Journal of Democracy* 32, 1 (January 2021), pp. 81-95.

Madhav Khosla and Milan Vaishnav, “The Three Faces of the Indian State,” *Journal of Democracy* 32, 1 (January 2021), pp. 111-125.

Week 3 (February 3): The Erosion of Democracy in the Neodemocracies and the Endurance of Autocracy

Jack Nicas, “What Drove a Mass Attack on Brazil’s Capital? Mass Delusion” (first article in the group of reports under the heading, “Pro-Bolsonaro Riots Laid Bare Threat to Brazilian Democracy”), *New York Times*, January 9, 2023.

Benjamin H. Bradlow and Mohammad Ali Kadivar, “How Brazil Can Prevent an Authoritarian Resurgence,” *Foreign Affairs*, January 12, 2023.

Denise Dressner, “Mexico’s Dying Democracy,” *Foreign Affairs*, Nov/Dec 2022.

Javier Corrales, “Why Maduro Hasn’t Fallen,” *Journal of Democracy* 31, 3 (July 2020), pp. 39-53.

Tarek Masoud, “The Arab Spring at 10: Kings or People?,” *Journal of Democracy* 32, 1 (January 2021), pp. 139-154.

Vivian Yee, “Economic Neglect and Political Instability Unraveled Tunisia’s Democracy,” *New York Times*, August 21, 2022.

Dan Slater, “What Indonesian Democracy Can Teach the World,” *Journal of Democracy* 34, 1 (January 2023), pp. 95-109.

Tim Hirschel-Burns, “Benin’s King of Cotton Makes Its Democracy a Sham,” *Foreign Policy*, April 8, 2021.

“Global Leader Approval Ratings,” *Morning Consult* (peruse numbers).  
<https://morningconsult.com/global-leader-approval/>

**PART II: UNDERSTANDING AND EXPLAINING DEMOCRACY’S CRISIS**

Week 4 (February 10): Structural Explanations for Democracy’s Crisis

Sheri Berman, “The Causes of Populism in the West,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 24 (May 2021), pp. 71-88.

Thomas Kurer, “The Declining Middle: Occupational Change, Social Status, and the Populist Far Right,” *Comparative Political Studies* 50, 10/11 (2020), pp. 1798-1835 (focus on pp. 1798-1808, 1825-1826).

Diana C. Mutz, “Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 115, 19 (2018), pp. E4330-E4439.

Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, "Trump and the Populist Authoritarian Parties: *The Silent Revolution in Reverse*," *Perspectives on Politics* 15, 2 (June 2017), pp. 443-454.

Daniel Oesch and Nathalie Vigna, "A Decline in the Social Status of the Working Class? Conflicting Evidence for 8 Western Countries, 1987-2017," *Comparative Political Studies* 55, 7 (June 2022), pp. 1130-1157.

Christian Welzel, "Why the Future is Democratic," *Journal of Democracy* 32, 2 (April 2021), pp. 132-144.

#### Week 5 (February 17): Psychology, Perception, and Misperception

John T. Jost and Orsolya Hunyady, "Mass Psychology in the Age of Trump," *Democracy* 48 (Spring 2018).

Wallace B. Mendelson, "Support of Trump through the Lens of Narrative Psychology," *Psychology Today*, November 17, 2020.

Bobby Azarian, "A Complete Psychological Analysis of Trump's Support," *Psychology Today*, December 27, 2018.

Dan McAdams, "The Appeal of the Primal Leader: Human Evolution and Donald J. Trump," *Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture* 1, 2 (Fall 2017), pp. 1-13.

Jacob Bogage, "Whom Are You Voting for? This Guy Can Read Your Mind," *Washington Post*, June 23, 2016.

Michael H. Pasek, Lee-Or Ankori-Karlinsky, Alex Levy-Vene, and Samantha L. Moore-Berg, "Biased Metaperceptions about Out-Partisans' Support for Democratic Principles May Erode Democratic Norms," *PsyArXiv Preprints*, September 19, 2021, pp. 1-13 (focus on pp. 2, 3, and 9).

David E. Broockman and Christopher Skovron, "Bias in Perceptions of Public Opinion Among Elites," *American Political Science Review* 112, 3 (August 2018), pp. 542-563 (focus on pp. 542-545, 559-561).

Danny Hayes and Jennifer L. Lawless, "There's Much Less Gender Bias in Politics Than You Think," *The Washington Post*, May 24, 2016.

#### Week 6 (February 24): Political Parties, Leadership, and Failures of Representation

Anna Grzymała-Busse, "Introduction to the Symposium on Global Populisms and the European Experience," *Polity* 51, 4 (October 2019), pp. 631-640.

Anna Grzymała-Busse, "How Populists Rule: The Consequences for Democratic Governance," *Polity* 51, 4 (October 2019), pp. 707-717.

Kenneth M. Roberts, "Bipolar Disorders: Varieties of Capitalism and Populist Out-Flanking on the Left and the Right," *Polity* 51, 4 (October 2019), pp. 641-653.

Milada Anna Vachudova, "From Competition to Polarization in Central Europe: How Populists Change Party Systems and the European Union," *Polity* 51, 4 (October 2019), pp. 689-706.

Sheri Berman, "Populism Is a Symptom Rather than a Cause: Democratic Disconnect, the Decline of the Center-Left, and the Rise of Populism in Western Europe," *Polity* 51, 4 (October 2019), pp. 654-667.

Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, "Fateful Alliances," ch. 1 in *How Democracies Die* (New York: Crown, 2018), pp. 12-32.

### Week 7 (March 3): Transnational Forces

Mitchell Orenstein, *The Lands In Between: Russia vs. the West and the New Politics of Hybrid War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), chs. 2, 3, 6, 7.

Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, "China's Threat to Global Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 34, 1 (January 2023), pp. 65-79.

Natalia Viana, "The Big Lie is Going Global. We Saw It in Brazil," *New York Times*, November 14, 2022.

Larry Diamond, "All Democracy Is Global," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2022.

Anne Applebaum, "Autocracy, Inc.: How the World's Authoritarians Work Together" (19<sup>th</sup> Annual Seymour Martin Lipset Lecture) and follow-up interview with Will Dobson, December 1, 2022 (watch on YouTube, beginning at 14:45).

**First exam (covers material weeks 1-7)**

### Week 8 (March 10): A Case Study

Arlie Russell Hochschild, *Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right* (New York: The New Press, 2016) (entire).

### PART III: NATIONALISM, BELONGING, AND DEMOCRACY

#### Week 9 (March 17): National Identity

Cory J. Clark, Brittany S. Liu, Bo M. Winegard, and Peter H. Ditto, "Tribalism is Human Nature," *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 28, 6 (2019), pp. 587-592.

Jonathan Haidt, "The Ethics of Globalism, Nationalism, and Patriotism," *Minding Nature* 9, 3 (Fall 2016).

Gina Gustavsson and Ludvig Stendahl, "National Identity, a Blessing or a Curse? The Divergent Links from National Attachment, Pride, and Chauvinism and Political Trust," *European Political Science Review* 12 (May 2020), pp. 449-469 (focus on pp. 449-454, 464-465).

Julian Erhardt, Steffan Wamsler, and Markus Freitag, "National Identity between Democracy and Autocracy: A Comparative Analysis of 24 Countries," *European Political Science Review* 13, 1 (February 2021), pp. 59-76 (focus on pp. 59-64, 70-72).

Amanda Lea Robinson, "Nationalism and Ethnic-Based Trust: Evidence from an African Border Region," *Comparative Political Studies* 49, 14 (2016), pp. 1819-1854 (focus on pp. 1819-1833, 1841-1844).

Jill Lepore, "A New Americanism: Why a Nation Needs a National Story," *Foreign Affairs* 98, 2 (March-April 2019).

#### Week 10 (March 24): Nationalism and Ethnonationalism

Constitution of India (1949), preamble and part III, sections 12-30.

Shashi Tharoor, *The Battle of Belonging: On Nationalism, Patriotism, and What It Means to Be Indian* (New Delhi: Aleph, 2020), prologue and chs. 1-4, 8-9, 12-13 and 15.

Donald Trump, "Address to the Nation on Immigration," January 8, 2019 (recommend watching video of speech: <https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/08/trump-immigration-speech-full-text-1088710>).

Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Presidential Medal of Freedom," January 19, 1989 (recommend watching video of speech: <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/remarks-presentation-ceremony-presidential-medal-freedom-5>).

Week 11 (April 7): National Unity and Disunity

Tharoor, *The Battle of Belonging*, chs. 16-19, 22-23, 28, 30-31, 33.

Prerna Singh, “In India, Protestors Are Singing the National Anthem and Waving the Flag. Here’s Why That Matters,” *The Washington Post*, January 20, 2020.

Frederick Douglass, “Composite Nation” (speech delivered in the Parker Fraternity Course, Boston 1867).

George Packer, “How America Fractured into Four Parts,” *The Atlantic*, July-August 2021.

M. Steven Fish, “Trump, Russia, and the Democrats’ Golden Opportunity,” *The American Interest*, July 24, 2019.

Gregory A. Petrow, John Transue, and Manuel Gutierrez, “How Do You Persuade Trump Supporters to Oppose the ‘Big Lie’?,” *Monkey Cage, Washington Post*, June 14, 2022.

Second exam (covers material weeks 8-11)

**PART IV: RHETORIC, COMMUNICATION, AND MESSAGING**

Week 12 (April 14): Communicating with Voters

Douglas Schrock, Benjamin Dowd-Arrow, Kristen Erichsen, Haley Gentile, and Pierce Dignam, “The Emotional Politics of Making America Great Again: Trump’s Working Class Appeals,” *Journal of Working-Class Studies* 2, 1 (June 2017), pp. 5-22.

Jesse H. Rhodes and Kaylee T. Johnson, “Welcoming Their Hatred: Class Populism in Democratic Rhetoric in American Presidential Campaigns, 1932-2012,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 47, 1 (March 2014), pp. 92-121.

Joanna Weiss, “What the Lincoln Project Ad Makers Get about Voters (and What Dems Don’t),” *Politico*, July 6, 2020.

Simon Dumenco, “The Lincoln Project’s Rick Wilson on the Ads that Actually Worked”; “The Lincoln Project Co-Founder on Killing Ads that Don’t Work—and Why Steve Bannon ‘Must Be Destroyed’”; and “Lincoln Project Co-Founder on What Happens Next—and the Continuing Marketing Battle against Trumpism,” *AdAge*, December 9, 11 and 14, 2020.

Drew Westen, “How to Win an Election,” *Psychology Today*, April 29, 2020.

Michael Sokolove, “Is This When Democrats Finally Learn to Message?,” *The New Republic*, September 15, 2022.

Week 13 (April 21): Disinformation and the War on Reality

Peter Pomerantsev, *This Is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War against Reality* (New York: Public Affairs, 2019) (entire).

**PART V: DEMOCRACY'S FUTURE**

Week 14 (April 28): The Way Forward

Ghia Nodia, "Democracy's Inevitable Elites," *Journal of Democracy* 31, 1 (January 2020), pp. 75-87.

Tharoor, *The Battle of Belonging*, chs. 37-38.

M. Steven Fish, Neil A. Abrams, and Laila M. Aghaie, "Make Liberalism Great Again," *Slate*, July 3, 2020.

Rob Willer and Jan Voelkel, "Here's What Persuades Americans to Support Democracy over Party," *Monkey Cage, Washington Post*, September 13, 2022.

Maria Ressa, "How to Fight Fascism before It's Too Late," *The Atlantic*, November 14, 2022.

Lucan Ahmad Way, "The Rebirth of the Liberal World Order?," *Journal of Democracy* 33, 2 (April 2022), pp. 5-17.

Timothy Snyder, "Ukraine Holds the Future," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2022.

**Third exam (focuses on material weeks 12-14, but comprehensive in coverage of course material)**

PS 191-3 Democracy's Global Crisis  
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For discussion week 1

1. Repucci and Slipowitz paint a grim picture of the state of democracy around the globe. Democracy has been declining in the world for 16 years. Established democracies such as the United States and India are faltering; in fact, Freedom House no longer classifies India as a “free” polity. Authoritarianism is hardening in the world’s preeminent autocracies, including China, Russia and Iran. What feelings do these facts elicit in you? Fear? Anger? Curiosity? Determination?
2. Diamond argues: “No global development of the twenty-first century has been more damaging to the cause of freedom than the emergence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the world’s next superpower, with the world’s fastest-growing military, a worldwide propaganda apparatus, and a program of global infrastructure development—the Belt and Road Initiative—that has already invested more than US\$200 billion in ports, railways, highways, energy pipelines, and the like in some sixty countries containing a majority of the world’s population.” Why, according to Diamond, is China’s emergence so threatening to democracy’s global prospects?
3. How, according to Fukuyama, does today’s world differ from the world of 30 years ago? What are the implications of the changes Fukuyama identifies for democracy?
4. Galston discusses what he regards as liberal democracy’s inherent weakness and the ways in which liberal democracy might appeal to human nature less strongly than antiliberalism does. What, if anything, do you think liberal democracy’s defenders can do, in practice, to address the problems that Galston identifies?

PS 191-3 Democracy's Global Crisis  
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For discussion week 2

1. Gellman provides an incisive blow-by-blow of the Republicans' effort to steal the 2020 presidential election and their current preparations to steal the 2024 election if their party's nominee doesn't win the Electoral College fairly. According to Gellman, what are the key ingredients of the Republican strategy? Gellman further argues that Biden neither grasps the threat to democracy nor seems to have a clue how to meet the challenge. Still, Gellman himself doesn't provide much concrete advice for Biden. What would you tell Biden to do?
2. Writing over a decade ago, Mann and Ornstein already saw the Republican Party as going off the democratic rails. Still, it's noteworthy that until Trump, a pro-democratic strain was still strong in the party. In 2008 and 2012, John McCain and Mitt Romney, each of whom were democrats (as well as decent human beings) were the Republican nominees for president; but in 2016 and 2020, Trump was the nominee (and the runner-up in 2016, when Trump had competition in the primary, was Ted Cruz). The pieces by Gellman, Schiff and Ben-Ghiat confirm the party's full break with fealty to democracy in the Trump era. With our authors' articles in mind, why do you think the Republicans abandoned democracy?
3. Ichihara rightly characterizes the Abe administration's violations of established norms as potential challenges to Japanese democracy. Yet one is struck by how minor these violations are in comparison with what's going on in other democracies. What's more, as she notes, some of Abe's reforms, such as bringing the bureaucracy more under the control of elected politicians, could even have a pro-democratic thrust. Japan's remarkable achievement is obvious in the data: In 2022 Freedom House rated it 96, higher than Germany (94), the UK (93), France (89), and the United States (83). Japan's status could be all the more remarkable since democracy didn't emerge organically but rather was imposed by an external power after WWII, and the Japanese economy has been stagnant for decades. How can we explain why, as Ichihara notes, "No major Japanese politicians or movements reject the democratic system, and no one calls for violence as a solution to political problems"? How does Japan do it?
4. Khosla and Vaishnav provide an incisive overview of the transformations Indian democracy has undergone since Modi and the BJP assumed power in 2014. One of the puzzles they raise is that the judiciary is submitting to executive power without even being compelled to do so. Add to that the fact that even as Modi degrades Indian democracy, he consistently enjoys the highest approval ratings of any leader of a major democracy (peruse the data on the Morning Consult). How can we explain this?

PS 191-3 Democracy's Global Crisis  
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For discussion week 3

1. According to Nicas, what drove Bolsonaro's supporters to ransack the main government buildings in Brasilia on January 8? According to Bradlow and Kadivar, what accounts for the resilience of Brazilian democracy to date, and how can Brazil sustain its democratic regime even in the shadow of Bolsonaro's persistence?
2. According to Dressner, how is ALMO undermining Mexican democracy? Based on Dressner's account and your own impressions, how do you think Mexican democrats can push back?
3. How, in Corrales's view, does Maduro retain his grip on power even as he drives Venezuelans into penury? In view of Corrales's analysis, do you see a way that Venezuelans could take back power and reestablish democracy? What might redemocratization in Venezuela look like?
4. According to Masoud, some of the MENA's dictators have a grand project, while the region's democrats do not. What is the dictators' project and why is it appealing to so many people in the region? What would a renewed pro-democratic project look like?
5. With Masoud and Yee's articles in mind, why has democracy failed in the MENA? Is democracy ill-suited to Arab culture? As you ponder the question, consider the possible tension Masoud raises between free elections (the core of democracy) and women's rights (a core liberal value) in Egypt and the region more broadly. Are Arab dictators justified in claiming that they are more "progressive" than democratically elected leaders are?
6. What does Slater think Indonesians can teach the world? What are the biggest threats democracy in Indonesia faces, and how can Indonesian democrats overcome them?
7. Benin was a leader of the wave of democratization that washed over West Africa in the early 1990s, and for the next quarter-century it had an open polity. But now it has become a model of autocratization. Hirschel-Burns calls Talon's "procedural reforms" a "master class in entrenching autocracy while preserving the sheen of democracy." What are the main elements of Talon's "master class," and how do you think he was able to snuff out rights and free elections so quickly?
8. How do you assess and explain the numbers you find in Morning Consult's ratings of global leaders?

PS 191-3 Democracy's Global Crisis  
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For discussion week 4

1. After reading Berman's review article, are you more inclined to favor economic (demand side, or "bottom up"), sociocultural (also demand side, or "bottom-up"), or institutional (supply side, or "top-down) explanations for the rise of right-populism in the West? (Bear in mind that Berman defines "institutions" very broadly to include laws and electoral rules, political parties, and international organizations.) Beyond these explanations, how do you regard voluntarist explanations, which attribute causal force to individual leaders?
  
2. Kurer's article represents the state of the art on grasping the effects of economic circumstances on support for right-populists in advanced industrialized countries. The theoretical and empirical link he draws (economic circumstances → status anxiety → support for right-populist parties) is an especially important contribution since it specifies *how* economic change has boosted the fortunes of the populist right. Yet he concludes by saying that it's impossible to infer from his findings any feasible policy prescriptions about how to defeat autocratizers in elections. He holds that the left's usual prescriptions such as boosting spending to benefit the working class aren't likely to be adequate. Technological change, he says, "renders postindustrial societies vulnerable to political forces responding to voters on the grounds of less tangible identity politics, which are difficult to counter with mundane, precise, and politically feasible policy reactions." This seems like a counsel of despair for those who seek to reverse the autocratic turn. But must we despair? Are there weapons besides "mundane, precise, and politically feasible policy reactions" that democrats can wield to regain the upper hand and quash the right-populist threat?
  
3. Mutz's findings suggest a raft of possible prescriptions for Democratic Party politicians in their struggle with the Republicans, though Mutz does not explicitly spell out those prescriptions. What would they be? Armed with her findings, what would you recommend that Biden and the Democrats do to win elections?
  
4. Inglehart and Norris assert: "The groundswell of support for populists ultimately reflects economic insecurity, but its immediate cause is a backlash against rapid cultural changes" (p. 452). In their framework, how have changing economic conditions and rapid cultural change interacted to produce a wave of popular support for democracy-degrading populists in the West? How does the causal chain they draw differ from Orenstein's? From Mutz's?
  
5. Oesch and Vigna's findings pose a head-on challenge to much of what many scholars and commentators assume has been driving working class voters' turn toward illiberal parties. How does the authors' findings challenge the standard accounts?
  
6. On what theoretical and empirical basis is Welzel's optimism founded? Do you think that Kurer would share Welzel's sanguinity about democracy's prospects? If he would be skeptical, what would be the basis of his skepticism? How does Welzel's account square with that of Inglehart and Norris?

PS 191-3 Democracy's Global Crisis  
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For discussion week 5

1. Jost and Hunyady identify a syndrome of liberals' cognitive dispositions that potentially impairs their ability to fight back against the antidemocratic onslaught in America. What are those traits and how do they hold liberals back? How could democracy's defenders in America alter their dispositions in order to more effectively fight the Trumpian menace? (And note that the last four words I've used here—"fight the Trumpian menace" might be language that some liberals would be uncomfortable using; you might feel uncomfortable about them yourself; what does that say about liberal thinking in light of Jost and Hunyady's analysis?)
2. In light of Mendelson's piece, how would you describe the Trumpian narrative? Try to write it out in a few sentences.
3. Azarian suggests that Trump could literally be changing our brains—our brains, not just our minds—and in an area that threatens core liberal values and interests. It's not hard to find potentially brain-changing rhetoric among Modi, Duterte, Orbán, and other demagogues well. How do you think democracy's defenders can fight back?
4. McAdams holds that "No U.S. president in recent memory, and perhaps none ever, has tapped so effectively into the primal psychology of dominance." Why do you think liberals cede high- dominance style and rhetoric to Trump?
5. Bogage reports experiments that show that Trump commands attention. How does Trump do it, and why do most of his opponents not?
6. Pasek and colleagues find that Americans underestimate how pro-democratic the values of the people on the other side are, and that this tendency can lead us to support more anti-democratic political practices that contribute to undermining democracy. What's the logic of these links, and how can this vicious cycle be broken?
7. Broockman and Skovron find that politicians of both parties grossly overestimate the conservatism of their constituents. Why do they do so? What do the authors' findings suggest liberals can do to correct politicians' perceptions and thereby tip their policies in a more liberal direction?
8. If you found Hayes and Lawless's findings surprising, why do you think you did? Do you hear what these authors report in your classes and discourse around Berkeley more generally? If not, why not?

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For discussion week 6

1. Grzymała-Busse summarizes the playbook that Hungary's Fidesz and Poland's PiS have followed to aggrandize their power and reverse democratization in Poland and Hungary. Understanding their strategy is all the more important given that the Trumpian right is now treating Orbán's regime as a shining example for America to follow (Trump told Orbán "it's almost like we're twins!" and Tucker Carlson has been lionizing Orbán and even broadcasting from Budapest to call his viewers' attention to the Hungarian model). Why do you think Orbán has captured the imagination of the Trumpian right, and where do we see Trump and his party following the Hungarian model?
2. According to Roberts, what are the structural conditions that favor the rise of left-populist parties in Latin America (and to some extent South Europe) and right-populist parties in Western Europe? What can democracy's defenders in each region do to stave off the authoritarian populist challenge?
3. Vachudova recounts that the right-populists' electoral triumphs in the Czech Republic came at time when the governing, prodemocratic Czech Republic's Social Democratic Party (CSSD) was delivering stability and stellar economic performance. What lesson does this experience hold for prodemocratic politicians and parties elsewhere?
4. What is the cautionary tale Berman tells about interwar Europe and how does it apply to United States and Europe today?
5. What is the "fateful alliance" that Levitsky and Ziblatt warn against? In the United States, who would be/are the partners in the fateful alliances that threaten democracy now? How do you assess the authors' recommendations to democracy's defenders for preventing/thwarting the fateful alliance? Apply these questions to the United States and a European case we are reading about this week as well.

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For discussion week 7

1. Orenstein quotes a UK House of Lords report saying: "The EU and Member States face a strategic question of whether Europe can be secure and prosperous if Russia continues to be governed as it is today" (p. 163). Orenstein himself asks: "Which will go first, Putin or the EU and NATO? It is very possible that Russia's attempts to undermine Western institutions will succeed" (p. 166). These are stunning statements. How did the leader of a country with a Canada-sized economy, little global cultural influence, and a population that is less than half the size of the United States' become an existential menace to the West's mainstay institutions? How did it manage even to infiltrate political systems and shape political outcomes in the West's most powerful core democracies—possibly even tipping a presidential election in the United States? Beyond examining Putin's methods, consider how democracies ever came to the point where they could be so readily manipulated by Putin's oligarchs, and how Russia's invasion of Ukraine and subsequent events have altered the picture Orenstein painted in February 2022 have altered the big picture?
2. Beckley and Brands hold that ideology drives Chinese leaders to vigorously oppose democracy around the world. What is the nature of that ideology, and how does it motivate the Chinese government's conduct? How can democracies counter what Beckley and Brands characterize as the PRC's democracy prevention program?
3. Viana shows how Bolsonaro and his supporters are aping Trump's and his supporters' post-electoral-loss behavior almost to a T. What does the Brazilian case reveal about the transnational influence of American politicians' domestic behavior? How precisely does the demonstration effect of what happens in America affect events in other countries? How can democrats in the United States partner with democrats in Brazil and other countries threatened by anti-democratic parties and movements?
4. Diamond argues that despite the enormous pressures democracy is under in the United States, Americans should not give up on aiding democrats abroad. What is the logic of Diamond's argument? How does he propose American leaders can foster democracy abroad even as they struggle to shore up democracy defenses at home? What do you think American democrats can learn from the experiences of other countries where democracy is under threat?
5. Anne Applebaum has become one of most articulate and incisive defenders of democracy in the United States and around the world. What did you learn from listening to her speech? What for you were the biggest takeaways?

PS 191-3 Democracy's Global Crisis  
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For discussion week 8

1. Hochschild confronts directly—and many would say successfully surmounts—the “empathy wall.” Does her book help you surmount that wall? Whatever your political views, how would you say it changed your intellectual understanding of those on the other side of the wall? Perhaps more importantly, how, if at all, did it change how you *feel* about them?
2. What do you think is the *most* important reason why the protagonists in *Strangers in Their Own Land* endure the decimation of their land, rivers, swamps, and air and still staunchly oppose any measures that would hold accountable those who have decimated their health, communities, and way of life?
3. In ch. 9, Hochschild spells out her take on the “deep story” of the people she is studying. She actually ran her version of their story by some of those people and reports that they largely affirmed it. Are there parts of their deep story that you can identify with? How does hearing their deep story help you better understand your own? How will it help you better communicate with people whose deep story differs from your own?
4. Among all the stories Hochschild tells, was there a particular one that you found especially revealing, poignant, or compelling? If so, which one, and why?
5. Hochschild completed *Strangers in Their Own Land* prior to Trump’s election, but the book arguably contributes more than any other work to understanding the social bases of Trump’s rise and reign. In a sense, then, it teaches us a great deal about why democracy is now under grave threat in America, and it provides invaluable clues into what democracy’s defenders can do about it. If Biden asked you what you learned from Hochschild about how he and the Democrats could win in 2022 and 2024, what would you tell him?

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For discussion week 9

1. Clark and coauthors find that liberals are as likely as conservatives to exhibit political bias, including in the ways they receive, believe, and use information. We are accustomed to hearing about how conservatives ignore scientific findings in order to rationalize their political views, and Clark et al. adduce climate-change denial among conservatives as an example of that. But the authors add: "On the other hand, a growing body of work suggests that liberals in general are more biased than conservatives about traditionally conceived disadvantaged groups (e.g., women, Blacks...likely because an important moral value of the political left is opposition to inequality." Clark et al. don't explicate the point, but the question arises: Why would the fact that "an important moral value of the political left is opposition to inequality" lead the left to ignore scientific findings regarding "traditionally conceived disadvantaged groups" such as women and African Americans? Can you think of an example where liberals' political bias leads them to ignore or misread scientific findings in the way that Clark et al. imply they do? (Hint: The piece by Hayes and Lawless we read a few weeks ago might provide insights.)
2. Where do you fall on Haidt's LVD test? Is your own mentality closer to that of a nationalist or a globalist? How do you think your outlook shapes the way you think of people on the other side?
3. Gustavsson and Stendahl find that national attachment and national pride (but not national chauvinism) promote political trust; Erhardt and coauthors report that civic nationalism (but not ethnic nationalism) promotes pro-democratic attitudes; and Robinson finds that nationalism reduces ethnic particularism. What would you recommend prodemocratic politicians, scholars, and activists do with the evidence these authors furnish?
4. Reflecting on Lepore's article, why is having distinctively *national* histories important for democracy's sustenance? How have democracy's foes hijacked their countries' histories for their own benefit, and what can democracy's defenders do to stop them?

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For discussion week 10

1. In chapter 2, Tharoor presents an array of categories of nationalism, but boils the main types down to two: ethnic nationalism and civic national. He considers “linguistic, cultural, territorial, religious, revolutionary, ‘civilizational’” nationalism to be “subsets and variants” and ethnic nationalism, and he characterizes civic nationalism to be little more than loyalty to “institutions, practices, and systems enshrined in a Constitution and reaffirmed regularly through a democratic vote.” He holds that “Whereas ethnic nationhood inheres in the body, civic nationalism appeals to the mind.” Yet some aspects of what he calls “ethnic” nationalism do not “inhere in the body” such as race does, and they don’t necessarily exclude any portion of the citizenry from nation. Do you think they can find a place in a “civic”—or, whatever we chose to call it, prodemocratic/inclusive— nationalism? Is propagation of civic nationalism as Tharoor defines it, which he says “appeals to the mind,” sufficient to win people’s hearts and votes back from the likes of Modi, Trump, and Orbán? Drawing on our reading for this week and your own knowledge and intuitions, can you imagine a form of prodemocratic, inclusive nationalism that is rooted in more than common fealty to “institutions, practices, and systems enshrined in a Constitution and reaffirmed regularly through a democratic vote”? What might it look like in India? How about in the United States?

2. Unlike in China and Russia, in India and the United States democracy is deeply embedded in national traditions. Both India and the United States have been democracies since their founding (though the United States was a partial one until 1965 and democracy was suspended in India during the Emergency of 1975-1977). Self-government and inalienable rights are etched into both countries’ constitutions. Yet, in both India and America, political parties that are ethnonationalists are now making great strides toward undermining free elections and redefining the nation in exclusionary terms and undermining democracy itself. Why? What are liberals in each country doing wrong and what could they do to better the confront the challenge?

3. Tharoor articulates India’s democratic-national story like this: “The fundamental DNA of India, then, is of one land embracing many. It is the idea that a nation may incorporate differences of caste, creed, colour, culture, cuisine, conviction, consonant, costume, and custom, and still rally around a democratic consensus. That consensus is around the simple principle that in a democracy under the rule of law, you don’t really need to agree all the time—except on the ground rules of how you will disagree” (pp. 130-131). How would you spell out Modi’s illiberal-national story? And if you were to spell out your own version of America’s democratic-national story, how if at all would it differ from Tharoor’s story of India?

4. Compare Trump’s and Reagan’s speeches on immigration. How would you say these two Republican presidents differed in their conception of what—and who—makes America great?

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For discussion week II

1. How does reading about the intellectual foundations of Hindutva (if they can be called intellectual) articulated by Savarkar, Golwalker, and Upadhyaya help you better understand Modiism—and how liberals can fight back against it?
2. Tharoor asserts that many Modi voters support him against their own economic interests, apparently “because he was consumed by fear of and hatred for an Other—usually defined as a Muslim, and additionally as a malign Pakistani general, or a fanatic terrorist despatched by Pakistan—assiduously stoked by the 'nationalists' in the ruling establishment. As a result, he saw in Modi his protector, the enabler of his hatred, and his shield against its consequences” (p. 217). Yet Tharoor also says that “Modi wins over the multitudes by being seen and as a decisive, no-nonsense leader with a hard head, willing to break with tradition, and attempt bold solutions to the nation's intractable problems” (p. 228). These are, of course, very different sources of appeal. Which one—Modi's bigotry or his perceived boldness and decisiveness—do you think is more important in explaining his astronomical popularity? How does how you answer that question influence the advice you would give liberals on how to fight Modi? Then consider the same questions for authoritarian populists in other countries, such as Orbán in Hungary and Trump in the United States.
3. According to Singh, what is the significance of Indian Muslims carrying the national flag and fighting for their rights as Indians rather than as Muslims? What would an analogous movement look like in America?
4. As Ayyub reports, anti-Muslim rhetoric, including from leaders of the BJP, has escalated to explicit calls for the extermination of the Muslim population—and Modi remains silent. Do you expect genocide to happen in India? If so, why? If not, why not?
5. How does Douglass's vision of America differ from that of the “Just America” that Packer describes? Which vision do you regard as more compelling and why? Do you think that Douglass's speech could serve as the basis for a new progressive Americanism? What would the content of that narrative be?
6. Packer states that to many in “Just America,” “any talk of progress is false consciousness—even hurtful.” With a glance back at the piece by Hayes and Lawless we read in week 5, why do some in “Just America” reject celebrating progress and declaring victory in civil rights battles—even when they win big? What are political consequences for progressive causes?
7. Fish sketches the beginnings of a national narrative that could stand as a counter to the Trumpian story. How would you write the American story yourself?
8. What do the findings of Petrow, Transue, and Gutierrez tell us about how democrats can mobilize nationalism to fight the challenges posed by illiberal leaders?

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For discussion week 12

1. Schrock and coauthors present a coherent account of the way Trump wins over audiences. What can Trump's adversaries learn from what he does, and how might an effective liberal politician put those lessons into practice in his or her own speeches in order to sway listeners and counter the Trumpian threat?
2. Rhodes and Johnson find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, class populism is as prominent in Democratic presidential candidates' rhetoric as it has always been. What do the authors' findings suggest for politicians, pundits, and scholars who urge Democratic Party candidates for office to focus on fighting economic injustice and inequality rather than on sociocultural issues?
3. After reading Weiss's article and Dumenco's interview with Rick Wilson, do you think that the Democrats should adopt the Lincoln project's approach to fighting Trumpism? Why do you think, as Wilson remarks, that Democratic Party operatives never even thought of airing the kinds of ads the Lincoln Project did during the 2020 campaign?
4. Westen argues forcefully, and on the basis of copious evidence from psychology and neuroscience, that emotions rather than rational calculation drive voting behavior and that the language used in messaging is far more important than issue positioning. But the pitch for healthcare that Westen offers at the end of his piece is, to this reader, abysmal; it seems to take no account of Westen's own revealing findings and compelling advice. Bearing in mind Westen's findings and advice as well as this week's other readings, write out a paragraph-long pitch for healthcare that you would give if you were Biden or another Democratic Party leader.
5. Sokolove says: "Liberated from the difficult task of having to defend policies and ideas, Republicans play exclusively on offense. It is another of their advantages. They attack—usually on the same familiar grounds—and the Democrats do a poor job of defending." What, according to Sokolove, can the Democrats do to go on the offensive?

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For discussion week 13

1. How does Maria Ressa use the internet to fight for democracy? Do you think that the internet can be made safe for democracy if there are enough Ressas in the world? Where will people like her come from? Might you become one such person yourself?

2. Lyudmila Savchuk expected her revelations about the IRA to provoke so much outrage that it would discourage workers at the IRA, prompt forceful counteractions in the West, and force the IRA to stop its work. Instead, as Pomerantsev reports, even many of her fellow activists outside the IRA just shrugged at her revelations. In another story, Mary Ana McGlasson found that all her revelations about the slaughter in Syria didn't move the needle on the world's readiness to help end the horror. Savchuk's and McGlasson's stories are emblematic of many others in which outrageous, systematic violations of decency, human rights, democracy, and the truth elicit shrugs even among those who oppose such violations and are victimized by them. What's going on here? Has the liars', cheaters', thieves', and killers' brazenness reached such heights that anything now seems normal? Has the internet given us so much information about everything that we no longer find anything shocking? Have defenders of democracy and the truth lost their nerve?

3. When Pomerantsev asked U.S. government lawyers why the IRA hadn't been sanctioned, he reports that "the primary reason given was that it was hard to define whether the IRA worked directly for the Russian government, and therefore whether their actions constituted the operations of a 'hostile state'." Given that the IRA committed arguably the most consequential assault on American democracy and security since the 1940s, and that fact that anyone who knows anything about Russia knows that the IRA works directly for the state, what does Pomerantsev's revelation tell us about the ability and willingness of the U.S. government to protect America's democracy and national security? What does it tell us about how dictators who seek to undermine democracy abroad can benefit from the "rule of law" in the United States?

4. In Fukuyama's piece that we read in week 1, the author states that "the global internet has been bifurcated into a closed internet controlled by China [and one might add, Russia] and a more open internet operated by a handful of private companies in the United States. The Chinese [and Russian] internet is deliberately managed with the goal of supporting China's [and Russia's] authoritarian government, while the Western internet has been operated to serve the interests of the private companies that control it. The latter are not in principle opposed to democracy, but their self-interest has allowed them to be used by antidemocratic actors who have discovered that conspiracy stories and fabricated information often are rewarded with more clicks than the truth receives." Pomerantsev's book confirms this. He notes that when Guillaume Chaslot, an AI engineer at Google, suggested to his bosses that the algorithms at YouTube (which Google owns) be changed to stop magnifying extremism, he was told that the company's primary interest was in maximizing the time people spend watching YouTube, not reducing political extremism. Fukuyama's article and Pomerantsev's book raise questions about how the United States can defend even its own democracy against both foreign saboteurs and domestic extremists. What could the U.S. government do to get

YouTube, Facebook, and other social media giants to prioritize reducing polarization, defending national interests, and protecting democracy? Does democracy itself require rules that make defending democracy impossible?

5. Near the end of the book, Pomerantsev asks the big question: “Ultimately, what does it mean to be an empowered, democratic citizen, the kind that Srdja Popovic envisions, online? How can the digital world become the space where freedom, rights—all those big words that have been bled of their vitality—are regenerated and given meaning?” (pp. 177-178). Pomerantsev doesn’t answer his own questions, but his book does provide clues. Drawing on what you’ve learned from the book and other works we’ve read, in addition to your own ideas about democracy, the media, and how to wield political power effectively, how would you answer his questions?

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For discussion week 14

1. Nodia contends that “Democracy does not depend only on rational individuals calculating their interests: It is also sustained by democratic passion” and adds “Unfortunately for liberals, passion is not their strong point. Many people are moved by a passion for individual liberty, but these feelings grow strong enough to drive major political mobilizations only when people are deprived of liberty.” This situation produces a conundrum that is now obvious in many countries: Liberal democracy’s foes seem to be more highly motivated than its friends are, and even its friends are rarely roused to fight for their liberties until they lose them. So what are democracy’s proponents who do recognize the danger to do?

2. Fish, Abrams, and Aghaie charge today’s liberals with being passive opinion-takers rather than aggressive opinion-makers, as being pushed around by illiberal demagogues and parties rather than standing up to them. Reflecting on our course readings and discussions, including from week 5, why do you think democrats in America and around the world have been unable or unwilling to mount effective counterattacks? Is the liberal democratic temperament too delicate to fight back and fight hard? Are democrats ignorant of why they’re losing? Do you see signs of a turnaround? If you want to see such a turnaround, what are you going to do to make it happen?

3. Why, according to Willer and Voelkel, do some voters support undemocratic candidates? What do the authors’ findings show about how voters can be discouraged from supporting undemocratic office-seekers?

4. Last week we heard Pomerantsev tell Ressa’s story, and this week we hear her own account of her struggle against Duterte and with Facebook. What lessons can we take away from her experience? What does she teach you about how to fight the takeover of your country by autocratizers like Duterte?

5. How, according to Way, might Putin’s attack on Ukraine provide a catalyst for turning the global tide against democracy’s foes? What signs do we see of a possible democratic comeback since Russia’s invasion? How do you think democrats in the United States and around the world can leverage Putin’s blunder to gain momentum in the struggle against democracy’s foes?

6. Why, in Snyder’s vision, does “Ukraine hold the future”? How, in Snyder’s narrative, do “big lies told by powerful people weaken democracy”? Why, according to Snyder, would “a Ukrainian victory give democracy a fresh wind”?