The United States and Asia after Bush

Michael J. Green

T. J. Pempel's core argument is that under the Bush administration, 'domestic political drivers' led to a 'militarization and unilateralization' of American foreign policy that 'deviated sharply' from previous administrations and led to a 'devastating decline in America's standing among most Asian publics'. This argument is wrong on both causality and outcome, but along the way Pempel does highlight some of the unresolved challenges that the next US administration will face. After briefly resetting the stage to accurately reflect the state of US-Asian relations, I intend to pick up some of Pempel's specific insights on China and US alliances, North Korea and regional integration, in order to illustrate the difficult choices for US Asia policy and to demonstrate why the next administration will likely stay on the course set by George W. Bush.

The actual state of US relations in Asia

Pempel's critique hinges on the assertion that America's standing in Asia has been ruined by the Bush administration. He acknowledges that official relations with countries are strong, but argues that a focus on state-to-state relations and the military dimensions of those ties leads to analyses that 'bypass the implications of Bush policies for non-elite opinion concerning the United States'. However, that is an assertion that is easily refuted by the preponderance of recent polling data about America's standing in Asia.

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For example, Yomiuri/Gallup polling shows that more Japanese have a positive view of US-Japan relations today than in the last year of the Clinton administration (Yomiuri Shimbun, 13 December 2007). Surveys of Chinese public opinion about the United States also show a higher regard for America today than eight years ago.1 The Pew Global Attitudes Poll (2008) found that the United States is the most popular country in South Korea and India and that US public standing continues to be strong across Asia.

The assertion that the United States has lost influence or soft power is also undermined by recent surveys. The Chicago Global Affairs Council conducted a survey in 2008 designed to test relative influence and soft power in Asia. Using a combination of indices to cover economic, cultural, human capital, political and diplomatic soft power, the poll demonstrated that the United States ranks well ahead of every other power in Asia, including China (Whitney and Shambaugh 2008). A significant majority of respondents in every country in the multinational poll also answered that over the past decade US influence in Asia has increased rather than decreased.2 On the question of how effective countries have been in promoting their own policies in the region, majorities in every country surveyed except China responded that the United States is doing a better job than China.

It is perhaps no wonder, then, that when it comes to US foreign policy, many Asians favor Republicans over Democrats, as Japanese journalist and scholar Yoichi Funabashi recently wrote in Foreign Affairs (Funabashi 2008: 110), and as even veterans of Democratic administrations still acknowledge, or at least acknowledged, New York Times foreign correspondent who had mostly experienced European attitudes found that Asians actually like the United States after eight years of George W. Bush (Cohen 2008).

The Iraq War infuriated Western Europe and much of the Middle East and was not terribly popular in East Asia either, but Asian states are preoccupied with economic development, balance of power and internal legitimacy. Iraq had only a second- or third-order impact on all three priorities and did not change the basic need in Asia for a strong US strategic presence. There was no countering against US power in Asia after the attack on Iraq. Quite the opposite - Asian states have all sought closer relations with Washington and US allies in the region sent troops and money. And rather than turning to an imagined ‘Beijing consensus’ on authoritarianism and non-interference in internal affairs, Asia’s other major powers from India to Japan and Indonesia are emphasizing universal norms and their own democratic identity, even as they seek closer pan-Asian modes of cooperation.

None of this is meant to minimize the significant challenges the United States faces in Asia (which will be addressed below), but a good diagnosis requires accurate data on the symptoms; and the data simply do not support the shaky prognosis that the Bush administration has caused a devastating decline in America’s standing in Asia.

If the diagnosis is wrong, it is less important to spend time refuting the arguments about causality, but some of the assertions do merit attention. For example, the story that the Bush administration is now disheartening to the region is in some ways a false story. It is true that US influence in Asia has increased, but it is also true that US influence in Asia has increased.

entrapment by neo-conservatives is by now standard fare in left-wing blogs such as The Daily Kos or The Huffington Post. Some of the accounts cited by Pempel are wrong, some of them are clichéd, and some will go down in history as real black marks for the Bush administration. However, nowhere is it demonstrated that internal political dynamics are more important drivers in US Asia policy than structural factors, as Pempel asserts. Tracing the causal path in Pempel’s essay, the reader comes across only one ‘smoking gun’ that presumably makes this link, and that is the undocumented assertion that the Bush White House rejected the nomination of a scholar to the US-Japan Friendship Commission because that person ‘presumably made contributions to the Democratic Party’. The supposed politicization of a commission focused on cultural and educational exchange with a close US ally is a pretty thin reed to hold up the argument that a band of ideologues bent on establishing a permanent Republican majority has knocked US grand strategy towards Asia off of a thirty-year bipartisan trajectory.3 I also doubt it is true. I am not aware of the case in question, but as the current Vice Chair of that commission, I see no shortage of Democrats and Independents among my fellow commissioners (though the work of the group is so non-political that the issue of party affiliation has never come up).

While Pempel’s arguments about symptoms and causality are often wrong, his detailed analysis of specific policy areas does offer a useful basis for examining the strengths and challenges of the next US president will face in Asia. The broad assertion that every Bush administration policy in Asia was crippled by ‘over-militarization’ and ‘unilateralism’ does not hold up under closer examination, but there have been tactical failings by both the Clinton and Bush administrations that have been compounded and must be addressed by the next president, and Pempel captures a number of these.

Bilateral relations

Both official pronouncements and popular poll numbers underscore the Bush administration’s claim that the United States now enjoys the best relations with Japan and China of the post-war period, and that for the first time in US foreign policy history both relationships are strong at the same time. But Pempel is right to point out that the Bush administration got off to a rocky start with China, beginning with then policy advisor Condoleezza Rice’s 2000 Foreign Affairs article labeling China a ‘strategic competitor’ and the 2001 crisis over the collision of a US EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese fighter jet. However, what is striking about the first year of the Bush China policy is not that it is an aberration but rather that it is so similar to the first years of the Carter, Reagan and Clinton China policy. China hands will recall that Jimmy Carter pledged to move away from Nixonian realism and to emphasize human rights, but his administration eventually normalized relations with China. Reagan came in promising to restore US-Japan relations, in particular ‘special relationship’, but limited military sales to Tokyo and economic cooperation with Peking. Clinton’s China policy was an effort to get China to open up to the West while keeping a firm grip on Taiwan, and his trade relationship with China was limited.
relationship with Beijing to put pressure on the Soviet Union. Clinton came in promising he would no longer ‘coddle the butchers of Beijing’, but later announced his intention to work towards a US-China strategic partnership. Bush (through Rice) claimed that China was actually a strategic competitor, but became the most prominent world leader to attend the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics. On that score, the next president may come into power with a greater consensus on China policy than during any previous transition. Indeed, it is stunning that China has not become a major political item in the US presidential election, with neither John McCain nor Barak Obama even referring to US-China relations in their convention acceptance speeches.

One significant challenge with respect to China for the next administration is one that Pempel dismisses as irrelevant, and that is the significant growth of Chinese military capabilities, particularly in niche areas such as anti-satellite, anti-access, nuclear weapons, and cyberspace (Gates 2008; Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007). It is true that the United States spends far more China or the rest of the world combined on defense, but no other country has the enormously expensive obligations of the United States to provide public goods and underpin security in almost every corner of the globe. What is striking in East Asia is the increase in Chinese defense spending (15–20 percent per year since 2001) has not been matched by Japan or Taiwan, which have had essentially flat defense budgets over the same period. Meanwhile, the US Navy and Air Force in the Pacific Theater have also had to sacrifice new systems and capabilities necessary to maintain the balance of power because of the heavy ground requirement in Iraq and Afghanistan. To some extent greater engagement of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and bilateral and multilateral CBMs will help to mitigate against risk, but that is the easy part. As Chinese capabilities increase, the next president will also have to make judgments about how much to recapitalize US forces in the Pacific, to encourage allies to take on larger security responsibilities, or to limit US commitments. It is the position of both the Democratic and Republican parties, the way that the United States must significantly increase the size of the Army and the Marine Corps.

The strengthening of the US-Japan alliance over this same period certainly has positioned the United States to reinforce a balance of power that will dissuade China from moving away from President Hu Jintao’s stated goal of ‘peaceful development’. Pempel generally describes the growing integration of US and Japanese planning and operations on missile defense accurately. He may also be right to assert that Japan’s deployments to Iraq and the Indian Ocean were largely symbolic, but in international security symbolisms, and Japan’s readiness to break new barriers in remote parts of the world with the Self Defense Forces sent an unmistakable signal throughout Asia that the US-Japan alliance was strong. This was not the result of ‘gaiatsu’ or US pressure, as it had been during the 1990-91 Gulf War, but rather Prime Minister Koizumi’s own determination to demonstrate to the Japanese people and Japan’s potential adversaries in Asia that his nation was ready to play a more assertive and responsible role. One thing that is certainly not true is that the US-Japan relationship was ‘overmilitarized’. The unprecedented nature of Koizumi’s decision to send naval ships to the Indian Ocean and troops to Iraq captured the attention of the world press, but it hardly constituted the totality or even the most important element in US-Japan relations in this period (nor did Japanese defense spending increase). Under Bush and Koizumi, the United States also reached new levels of trust and cooperation on issues as far ranging as the Sri Lankan Peace Process, the G-8 and APEC agenda, and North Korea policy. An unprecedented series of high-level bilateral forums were established on foreign policy coordination, aid strategy, economic integration and climate change. None may have had the ‘man-bites-dog’ novelty of Japanese troops deploying abroad, but they account for the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance at least as much as the more publicly analyzed and scrutinized decision to send Japanese troops abroad.

None of this means that the US-Japan alliance is beyond retrenchment, drift or crisis. The Bush administration’s promise to lift sanctions on North Korea in 2007 has been broadly criticized in Japan as a betrayal of earlier pledges made that Pyongyang would not be lifted from the list of State Sponsors of Terror without progress on the abduction issue (Nikkei Shimbun, 16 March 2007). Japanese press and unattributed official commentary also has expressed alarm at the perceived US tolerance of North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006. In addition, the rapid collapse of the Abe and Fukuda governments and the seemingly intractable impasse in the Japanese Diet since the Opposition took control of the upper house in July 2007 are certain to test the patience of either John McCain or Barak Obama, both of whom have pledged to continue working on stronger US-Japan ties (Danzig and Nye 2008; McCain and Lieberman 2008).

Pempel has noted the difficult relationships between a conservative government in Washington and the progressive governments of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun in Seoul. Whether one blames the conservatives in Washington or the progressives in Seoul will probably depend on the observer’s own ideological predisposition. However, two aspects of the US-Korea relationship in this period do point to the durability of this alliance. The first is consistent opinion-polling that shows the United States remains the most popular country in Korea, despite the occasional drama of candlelight vigils and protests in downtown Seoul (Joong Ang Ilbo, 22 September 2007). The second is the output of the alliance between 2001 and 2008, during which time South Korea sent the largest dispatch of troops to Iraq after the United States and the United Kingdom, signed the most significant bilateral free trade agreement in Asia with the United States, and negotiated a major realignment of US forces within Korea. The challenge for the next administration is one Pempel indicates, and that is the predisposition of many American strategic thinkers – and not just Republicans – to conceptualize
the US–ROK alliance as a second-tier alliance after Japan and Australia. This bias reflects the accidental beginnings of the US–ROK alliance, the negative images of protests in the South, and Seoul’s preoccupation with peninsular rather than regional or global strategic issues. It will be important for the next president to reconceptualize the US–ROK alliance as a first-tier, regional and global alliance that is comprehensive in scope.

North Korea

Pempel argues that North Korea policy represents the Bush administration’s most explicit failure. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program certainly remains one of the most difficult and unresolved challenges on the plate for the next president. If one believes that North Korean leader Kim Jong II is prepared to abandon nuclear weapons in exchange for security assurances and economic assistance, then it would be logical to conclude that the Bush administration approach was a total failure. But North Korea’s violation of every pledge ever made on nuclear weapons from the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula of 1992 to the 1994 US–DPRK Agreed Framework and the 2002 Japan–DPRK Pyongyang Joint Declaration would strongly suggest that Pyongyang sees nuclear weapons as essential for regime survival under any circumstances.

Convincing the North to abandon its nuclear weapons programs will require a full toolkit of sanctions, deterrence and containment – but also engagement, inducements and diplomacy. The shortcoming of both the Clinton and Bush administrations has been the difficulty of combining this toolkit into a single strategy instead of veering from engagement without pressure to pressure without engagement and then back again to engagement without pressure.

The Kelly mission to Pyongyang in October 2002 began with the intention of offering North Korea a ‘grand bargain’ of significant inducements in exchange for significant changes in North Korean behavior. First, however, it was essential to bring North Korea back into compliance with the Agreed Framework, which the entire US intelligence community (without dissent or footnote) asserted that Pyongyang was violating by procuring almost the entirety of components needed to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. This was also the conclusion of the South Korean intelligence community before the Blue House realized what had happened and muzzled further assessments. When Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Suk Joo acknowledged the HEU program to the Kelly mission (including this author), the Bush administration kept the information airtight while consulting with Japanese and South Korean counterparts on next steps. Inevitably, the information leaked. Because the North had violated the Agreed Framework, the administration could not legally provide further heavy fuel oil to Pyongyang. This led the North Koreans to begin reprocessing the spent fuel at the Yongbyon facility to expand the nuclear arsenal and also to begin a covert relationship with Syria to produce a Yongbyon-like facility that the Israeli Air Force would later bomb in September 2007 (Sanger and Mazzetti 2007).

The Bush administration determined that a return to bilateral negotiations would leave the United States with limited leverage, since neither unilateral military attack nor economic aid were practical tools at that point. The decision was made to embed the negotiations in a multilateral process that included China, Japan and South Korea – all of which had significant sources of leverage of their own. The resulting Six Party Talks process created an unprecedented regional framework that the next president will inevitably want to utilize. While it may be romantic to portray Assistant Secretary of State Chris Hill’s renewed bilateral negotiations with the North as the result of successful internal bureaucratic politics and the triumph of diplomats over neocons, the reality is that by 2007 China was fully enough invested in the Six Party process that the US side could expand direct negotiations with Pyongyang without risking Chinese disengagement (which was a very real danger in the early phases of the diplomacy). To be sure, there were intense debates within the Bush administration that often led to dysfunctional results and delays in diplomacy. From the perspective of this participant, however, the greater tactical failing was allowing China as host of the Six Party Talks to postpone sessions until Pyongyang had been sufficiently bribed, cajoled or frightened into attending. A better model for multilateral diplomacy with an intransigent and dangerous foe would have been the Contact Group that dealt with Milosevic in the 1990s. That group would meet regardless of whether or not Milosevic was ready and was able to keep the pressure on in ways that were lost with North Korea.

Whatever narrative one prefers, the US negotiators were given an unusually free hand to try to reach an agreement with the North in the wake of the October 2006 nuclear test. The resulting agreement announced in a Six Party Joint Statement on 13 February 2007 was eventually reduced in the negotiation process to a much narrower declaration on North Korean facilities at Yongbyon and the disablement of those facilities, in exchange for sanctions-lifting and other steps by the United States (Office of the Press Secretary 2008). North Korea’s HEU program, nuclear weapons and proliferation activities were sidelined in order to achieve a small but measurable step forward. However, Pyongyang has refused to provide verification protocols demanded by the other parties and has threatened to rebuild and recommence operations at Yongbyon. Having made significant concessions to Pyongyang and abandoned most of the other requirements of the September 2005 and February 2007 joint statements with North Korea (which called for disablement and declaration on all nuclear programs), the Bush administration has been unwilling to make any further concessions and – importantly – Japan, South Korea and both US presidential candidates have agreed that verification cannot be put aside (Office of the Spokesman 2005, 2007).

The bureaucratic fights and difficult diplomatic interactions with other members of the Six Party Talks have led a number of authors before Pempel to suggest . . .
to assert that an opportunity was lost to disarm North Korea (Chinoy 2008; Funabashi 2007). But despite the dramatic narratives about the struggles within and among the Six Parties, no author has provided credible evidence at all to suggest that Pyongyang was ready to denuclearize. The reality is that North Korea intended to expand its nuclear arsenal from the beginning. As Kim Il Sung’s former propagandist, Hwang Jang Yop, told me in Washington in October 2003, Pyongyang intended to cheat on the Agreed Framework from the beginning; the only question was whether they would do so covertly or ‘confront the Americans’. And in March 2003 North Korean negotiator Li Gun conveyed Pyongyang’s warning to the US delegation at talks in Beijing that North Korea would test, expand and transfer its deterrent if the United States did not end its ‘hostile policy’ and accept the North’s new reality.

None of this changes the tactical failings of the Bush administration, but it does strongly suggest that the outcome with North Korea today has much more to do with North Korean intentions and much less to do with US politics than Pempel argues. And it also should remind the next administration just how difficult this problem is and how important it is to avoid simple black and white answers such as engagement versus containment. The North Korea problem is difficult enough that it will require a comprehensive toolkit and a process that induces and pressures Pyongyang at the same time.

**Regional integration**

The title of Pempel’s last section, ‘American unilateralsim versus Asian regionalism’, builds an argument that completely ignores a score of US multilateral initiatives in Asia in recent years. Beginning with Clinton’s inspired decision to elevate APEC to a summit in 1993, the United States has consistently moved to complement its traditional ‘hub and spokes’ approach to Asia with a robust multilateralism. Under Bush, the United States has initiated the Six Party Talks, the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (AP-6), the US-Japan–Australia Trilateral Security Dialogue, the Regional Core Group in response to the 2006 Tsunami, among other functional and highly operational regional cooperation mechanisms. President Bush has attended every APEC Summit (Clinton missed two) even within a few weeks of 9/11, and the United States took the lead in expanding APEC’s mission to include transnational security challenges such as terrorism, proliferation and pandemics.

Pempel rightly criticizes Secretary of State Rice for skipping two ASEAN Regional Forum meetings, but the damage was one of perception (that she is not interested in Asia) and not that she missed an opportunity to achieve anything through the ARF, which produces agreements broad enough and meaningless enough that countries like North Korea can join the consensus. It is true that the United States has not joined the new East Asia Summit (EAS), but is it right to say that this new forum is more important than APEC? A quick comparison of the substantive agenda and output at recent APEC and East Asia Summit meetings demonstrates quite clearly that APEC is producing real results and the EAS is still just a meeting.

The problem – and one the United States will have to address – is once again one of perceptions. Since the US response to the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, Asian governments have felt the strong need to establish their own forum to explore what is now called an ‘East Asian Community’. The Clinton administration’s push to include Chile, Peru and Mexico in APEC only gave further momentum to that goal.

The Bush administration initially took a neutral position on the EAS, waiting to see whether it might die on the vine or require a new approach to multilateral engagement in the region. It is now increasingly obvious that the EAS is an institution that is here to stay and the next administration will want to find a way to become involved. The requirement – signing the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation – would not be insurmountable for Washington, since both Japan and Australia signed and then issued side statements retaining their existing treaty obligations and commitments to UN conventions on human rights and other norms that might be challenged by ASEAN’s principle of ‘non-interference in internal affairs’. A somewhat more difficult logistical question would be how to stage two presidential visits to Asia when there are so many other international demands on an American president’s time than there are on his Asian counterparts. The next president could decide to take that time, to send the vice president, or to consider some form of combination with APEC (though kicking the Western Hemisphere members out is a diplomatic non-starter for US policy). It would also be important for the next president to institutionalize the Bush administration’s proposal for a US–ASEAN Summit, which was ultimately postponed because of Burma’s (Myanmar’s) crackdown on the Saffron Revolution in August 2007.

One thing the next president does not have to do is to panic about the prospect of US exclusion from Asian regional integration (Policy Dialogue Brief 2007). The reality remains that Asia has multiple competing forums precisely because countries such as Japan, Australia, India and even China have competing demands on their diplomacy. There is no consensus among the major powers in Asia about the proper membership or even definition of ‘Asia’; or about the norms that should guide regional integration. Nor is there any evidence of serious decoupling from the North American or global economies. It is true that 55 percent of Asian trade is now intra-regional, compared with 44 percent for NAFTA, but the end markets are still largely outside of the region. Moreover, capital flows from Asian economies are overwhelmingly going out of Asia, while Asian economies depend overwhelmingly on internal flows of capital for their own development (Nishimuro 2007). (The decoupling thesis was probably dealt its greatest blow by the Shanghai stock market’s decline far below the NYSE when the subprime crisis hit.) Pempel’s description of US economic challenges – including failings by the Bush administration on fiscal discipline
and the strength of the dollar – do point to the need for some significant changes of course by the next administration in certain areas. However, the US share of global GDP only went from 26 percent to 25 percent over the past eight years, mostly because of impressive growth among the ‘BRICs’ (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) (Faulconbridge 2008). This is hardly a picture of accelerated economic decline or a harbinger to Asia that the United States is joining the ash heap of history. And it is a bit unfair to blame the Bush administration for protectionism in the US Congress, since the Democratic leadership could significantly strengthen US leadership on regional economic integration in Asia by approving the Korea–US Free Trade Agreement, which they now are blocking. Overall, the Bush administration has positioned the next administration well to continue engaging in the fluid, overlapping and steadily more important multilateral diplomacy of the region.

The real critique

Like many Japan scholars, I have benefited enormously from Pempel’s first-rate scholarship on Asia, particularly with work like Regime Shift (1998). But the projection of one-sided critiques of domestic American politics and the Iraq War on to Asia creates a distraction from the real dynamics of trans-Pacific relations.

Certainly, there were tactical failures in Asia for Bush as there were for Clinton, and many of those are acknowledged above. But on the whole the bipartisan consensus on broad Asia strategy has not altered over the past fifteen years and the US position in the region remains strong as a result. (Indeed, it is measurably stronger if one uses polling data.) Pempel inadvertently acknowledges the strong continuity in Asia policy by correctly citing the October 2000 Armitage–Nye report as the conceptual basis for much of Bush Asia policy – Nye, of course, worked for Bill Clinton, as did about half of the report’s authors. And a careful analysis of the difficult challenges ahead on North Korea, alliances, China and regional integration suggests how limited the room for radical divergence from the Bush approach really is.

The real critique of US Asia policy is one that can be aimed at both Republican and Democratic administrations and is one of process rather than content – that is the inconsistent application of high-level attention to Asia. Rice may have skipped two ARF meetings, but Warren Christopher barely travelled to Asia at all when he was Bill Clinton’s Secretary of State. And before that George Herbert Walker Bush’s Secretary of State, James Baker, was almost as absent. Where were all of these Secretaries of State going? To the Middle East, of course. The Iraq War has certainly distracted senior US policy makers from Asia (Green 2008). But given the usual practice of the senior cabinet members to date, it is easy to see how this would have happened even if the United States had relied exclusively on diplomacy to handle Saddam Hussein.

There are exceptions. George Schultz invested in Asia. Richard Armitage and Bob Zoellick as Deputy Secretaries of State set strong examples of American presence in the region. Secretary of Defense Bill Perry receives high marks in the region as well. It is largely their work that has kept the US position in the region strong, though both Presidents Clinton and Bush deserve no small share of credit for the personal relationships they set with regional leaders and the rejection of protectionism and China-bashing at home.

But Asia is not standing still. By all objective measures, the region is becoming the most dynamic and important in the world. The US position in Asia will suffer if succeeding administrations do not pick up their game.

Notes

1 See, for example. Chan (2007); Committee of 100 (2007). The same trend is evident in the Mansfield Center’s polling on Chinese attitudes to the United States over the past eight years (Mansfield Asian Opinion Poll Database 2006).

2 The multinational poll covered the United States, China, Japan, South Korea and Indonesia.

3 I now serve as Vice Chair of the US–Japan Friendship Commission, which is completely apolitical and focuses on cultural and educational exchange. I was invited to join by serving commissioners who had written openly critical analyses of the US–Japan alliance, some of which is cited by Pempel.

4 The location of the uranium facilities was underground and not as well understood as the external procurement activities, and North Korea had deployed close to 200 NODONG missiles ranging Japan by 2003, so military tools were too dangerous to use (though all options were always notionally on the table in the diplomacy with North Korea for both the Clinton and Bush administrations). Responding to North Korean violations of previous agreements with promises of new US economic aid was an equally unattractive scenario.

5 In meetings with President Jiang Zemin in February 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell pushed for China to participate in the Six Party Talks. Jiang’s reaction was that this was a US–DPRK problem and China was not associated. But after three years of US–China cooperation within the Six Party process, Beijing’s position changed considerably and the Chinese quickly joined the United States in calling for sanctions in the Security Council after the North Korean test in October 2006.

References


A response to Michael Green

T. J. Pempel

The editors of The Pacific Review have generously offered me the opportunity to reply briefly to Professor Green's critique. I have benefited considerably in the past from Green's work and I have been an admirer of his dedicated and diligent public service even when I have disagreed with some of the policies he has advanced. That he has responded with such care and balance to my broad-ranging critique of the Bush administration's policies toward Asia reflects his unusual fusion of talents as a policy maker and a scholar. I learned a great deal from his response and hope that my comments will shed further light for readers on our areas of agreement and disagreement.

The editorial deadline is short and because there are many areas where I agree with Green's critique I will highlight those points in bullet form. I will then spend a little more time in defense of my arguments where we disagree. I hope that the exchange will prove not only intellectually rewarding for readers but also that it will underscore and perhaps influence the incoming American administration which both Green and I agree will face considerable challenges in improving US-Asian relations.

Our areas of agreement fall into several key categories:

Foreign policy tools and approaches:

- failure to devote consistent high-level attention to Asia because of preoccupations with the Middle East;

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