Max Weber’s theory of leadership authority has deeply influenced theories of political parties, but Weber’s concept of charisma is often used indiscriminately to refer to all kinds of personalist leadership. What is more, Weber’s tripartite typology of traditional, charismatic and rational-legal authority neglects a form of leadership often found in major contemporary political parties. This article formulates a differentiated typology and conceptualization of personalism, and theorizes an important but heretofore poorly understood form of political organization: the non-charismatic personalist political party. The leaders of such parties embody great personal authority within their organizations and often serve as symbols around which their parties can rally. But they are anything but prophets. Their authority arises not from an ability to inspire or transform their followers but rather from the skill to mediate conflicts within the party.

THE ART OF BEING INDISPENSABLE
Noncharismatic Personalism in Contemporary Political Parties

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This article aims to conceptualize and explain the emergence of an important but undertheorized form of political organization: the non-charismatic personalist political party. We follow Max Weber in stressing the significance of leadership authority for understanding the character and cohesion of political parties. But we argue that Weber’s tripartite typology of traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal authority neglects an important form of personalist leadership that existed in his own time and that is prevalent in present-day political life as well.¹ In fact, the very power and allure of Weber’s theory of charisma may have slowed subsequent progress among scholars toward fuller theorization of subtler forms of personalism.

¹. According to Weber (1964, p. 409; 1978, pp. 1130-33), the same three basic modes of legitimation prevail in political parties as in other forms of human organization.
In the broadest sense, Weber (1964) understood charisma to refer to “supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers and authorities” (p. 358). More precisely, a charismatic leader embodies and symbolizes a set of transcendental ends in pure form—transcendental in the sense of surpassing or rising above merely private regards and interests. Traditional authority also transcends private interests. However, whereas the legitimacy of traditional authority rests on historical precedent, the charismatic leader seeks a radical break with the status quo. “Charismatic authority,” Weber wrote, “repudiates the past, and is in this sense a specifically revolutionary force” (p. 362). Charismatic leadership is no ordinary occurrence. It transforms the audience; it “revolutionizes men from within” (Weber, 1978, p. 1116). The charismatic leader is a prophet, not merely a personality.

Weber also recognized a form of institutionalized charisma that he referred to variously as “office charisma” or “clan charisma” (Weber, 1968, p. 194; Weber, 1978, pp. 1135-1141). Followers of Weber have drawn on and extended these concepts to build theories of contemporary political organizations. Ken Jowitt developed the theory of “charismatic impersonalism” to characterize the form of authority dominant in Leninist parties. Jowitt’s work, along with Philip Selznick’s classic study of the Bolshevik party as an “organizational weapon,” demonstrated that revolutionary and transformative ends can be institutionalized (Jowitt, 1992, chap. 1; Selznick, 1952). Weber also explained how charisma could be “routinized” in the form of rational-legal authority. One of his great insights was to explain how the routinization of charisma led to a conception of the organization as a technical instrument and to a transference of loyalties to the instrument itself. This shift enabled functionaries to remain neutral with respect to ends and faithfully to serve any political master. Whereas the charismatic leader represents transcendental ends, rational-legal authority reflects \textit{means that transcend the ends}. Thus, loyalty shifts from transcendental ends to transcendental means—from commitment to the ends served by the organization to the organization itself. As Weber’s student Roberto Michels (1959) wrote in his study of the bureaucratization of political parties: “Thus, from a means, the organization becomes an end” (p. 373).

Yet, we argue that Weber’s theory did not include one type of authority that potentially complements his discussions of charisma, institutionalized charisma, and rational-legal authority. We call this type of authority \textit{non-charismatic personalism}. Noncharismatic personalism shares with rational-legal authority a substitution of transcendent means for transcendent ends. The noncharismatic personalist leader represents the party itself. At the same time, however, as in the case of charismatic leadership but in contrast with rational-legal authority, the basis for the leader’s legitimacy is personal.
Members of the organization identify with the leader as a person more than as an officeholder. In this regard, noncharismatic personalism resembles traditional authority. However, noncharismatic personalist authority does not appeal primarily to historical precedent and the force of habit as the basis for legitimacy. Thus, noncharismatic personalism differs clearly from traditional authority.

In the literature on political parties, only one type of leadership authority has been widely recognized as being both personal and means oriented: patronage-based clientelism. But the personal loyalties associated with clientelism are particularistic and private regarding, whereas noncharismatic personalism, like charismatic leadership, is universal and public in character. Thus, we argue that noncharismatic personalism is a distinctive type of authority. While this form of leadership is important and is not difficult to find in political parties, Table 1 helps illustrate why Weber overlooked it. Weber linked transcendental ends with the personal creativity of charisma and means-oriented rationality with the impersonalism of bureaucracy. However, this dichotomy actually contains two dimensions: Jowitt’s charismatic impersonalism adds the possibility of marrying transcendental ends to impersonal organization; and our concept of noncharismatic personalism completes the missing cell in the table, showing that it is possible to combine an orientation toward technical means with loyalty to person.

Table 1
*Types of Leadership Authority*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loyalties of Membership</th>
<th>Impersonal</th>
<th>Personal</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Claim to Leadership Authority Based on Representation of Transcendental Ends</td>
<td>“Clan” or “Office” Charisma (Weber) “Charismatic Impersonalism” (Jowitt) The “Organizational Weapon” (Selznick)</td>
<td>Charismatic or Traditional Authority (Weber) The “Charismatic Party” (Panebianco)</td>
</tr>
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*Note:* Works of all authors appearing in the table are cited in the text, except for Maurice Duverger (1978). See especially pages 63-71.
In developing our argument on noncharismatic personalism, we engage largely in theory elaboration (see Vaughan, 1992). We have two main goals. One is to formulate a theory about the conditions under which noncharismatic personalism emerges in modern political parties in open, competitive political systems. Here we will specify how differences in the form of personalism may be explained by variation in a single, specific causal factor—the type of cleavages present within the party.

Our other main aim is to characterize noncharismatic personalism and to distinguish it from other forms of personalist leadership. To advance our argument, we employ a comparative case study design that resembles J. S. Mill’s “method of agreement.” We focus on the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) under Helmut Kohl, the French Socialist Party under François Mitterrand, and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation under Gennadii Ziuganov. Across these three cases a great many differences are found in the environmental factors that may affect parties, and the parties themselves cover a broad spectrum in terms of their histories, memberships, and political orientations. Yet, we show that a crucial similarity common to all three led to a critical, defining similarity in “outcome,” producing a party of a particular type in each of the three cases. Such a design helps us not only to advance a novel explanation but also to develop our central concept—noncharismatic personalism—by illustrating its concrete organizational manifestation in a wide range of contexts.

The next three sections set out our conceptual and theoretical framework. We then present the case studies. We conclude with a discussion of the significance of noncharismatic personalist leadership in contemporary political parties. Our analysis focuses exclusively on political parties in competitive, open democracies and is meant to apply only to such organizations.

TOWARD A TYPOLOGY OF PERSONALIST POLITICAL PARTIES

Broadly, personalism refers to loyalty to persons rather than to impersonal ideologies, institutions, or rules. While all leadership is to some extent personalist, many political parties have highly formalized operating procedures and means of leadership selection. In such parties prospective leaders often move through regularized career paths before they become eligible for top

2. See Mill (1967) and Skocpol and Somers (1980, pp. 183-184). See also Collier and Mahoney (1996) and especially the discussion of the “method of agreement” and the advantages and limitations of “no-variance designs” (pp. 72-74).
posts. Leaders emerge through collegial consensus building, with formal criteria such as seniority playing an important role. Collective, rather than monocratic, modes of decision making predominate, with decisions taken by the membership as a whole or (more commonly) by a broad leadership, embodied in a directorate, a presidium, or a central committee. To distinguish this type of leadership structure from personalism, we refer to the organizations that adopt it as consensus-centered formal parties. Many northern European social-democratic parties, as well as the Italian Communist Party and its successor, have often taken such a form of organization.

Our main goal here, however, is to develop a differentiated typology of personalist parties. We therefore focus on forms of personalist authority, dividing the universe of personalist parties into four categories: patronage parties, charismatic parties, quasi-charismatic parties, and noncharismatic personalist parties. Each of these types is distinguished by a particular structure of leadership authority. Leaders differ in the character of their roles, their sources of political authority, their personal styles, and the means by which they maintain their authority. These differences are summarized in Table 2.

The role played by the leader in patronage parties is distributional. Leaders manage the distribution of resources within their realms of control and
responsibility. Patronage parties have multiple leaders and the identity of each leader is rooted in one section of the party. By personal style, leaders are paternal. They maintain their positions not only by controlling party resources and activists but also by negotiating the distribution of resources with the party’s other patrons.

Leaders of charismatic parties assume—or attempt to assume—transformational roles. They regard themselves as agents of massive social change transcending the party or even any particular ideology or program. Their main source of identity is themselves, and their personal style is messianic. They maintain power by holding their followers in thrall.

Quasi-charismatic leaders’ roles may be characterized as representational. These leaders adhere unabashedly to a particular ideology and represent it in the party—and, where they achieve prominence in national government, in the country as a whole. Their own political identity is tied more closely to a philosophy than to the party per se. As crusaders for a cause, their personal style tends to be dynamic and audacious, even brash and flamboyant.3 They maintain power in the party by controlling the dominant faction and preserving its ascendance.

Noncharismatic personalist leaders assume transactional roles.4 Ever mediating among constituencies and tendencies within the party, they are the brokers who manage internal conflict in pursuit of preserving party unity. They strive to make themselves indispensable. Their authority in the party depends on their indispensability in managing intraparty conflict rather than on tradition, charisma, or legal norms. Their own identity is rooted squarely in the party itself, and they always place organizational cohesion and effectiveness above political principle. In their personal styles, they tend to be noncharismatic indeed. Often staid and untelegenic, they sometimes suffer as much derision outside the party for their unprepossessing personalities as they enjoy respect within the party for their organizational prowess. The noncharismatic personalist leader maintains his or her authority by means of what John Padgett and Christopher Ansell (1993) have characterized as “robust action,” which involves an aptitude for speaking effectively to

3. Our concept of quasi-charisma in some respects resembles Robert Tucker’s (1970) notion of “situational charisma,” although we do not, in contrast with Tucker, regard the phenomenon necessarily as the product of “acute distress” in broader society (pp. 81-82). See also Panebianco (1988, p. 52).

4. Some of the terms we employ here are used differently by other authors. For example, in his discussion of “transactional leadership,” James McGregor Burns (1978) refers broadly to exchange relationships between leaders and followers, whereas our conception emphasizes brokerage.
multiple, often diverse, audiences within the party and for convincing each audience that he or she represents its interests and aspirations.

THE ROOTS OF PERSONALISM: SOME EXPLANATIONS

In Weber’s view, charismatic leadership emerged in response to deep crisis (Gerth & Mills, 1958, pp. 245, 249; Graham, 1993, p. 74). This assumption prevented Weber from fully investigating the role of personalist leaders in noncrisis situations or even from questioning seriously whether “crisis” was the real root of the emergence of a charismatic leader (see Blondel, 1987, pp. 58-62). Weber’s perspective pervades much contemporary thinking on leadership (e.g., Madsen & Snow, 1991; Rustow, 1970; Tucker, 1970). Yet, the notion of crisis provides only limited insight into personalism or into noncharismatic personalism in particular. Setting aside the thorny problem of operationalizing the concept of crisis (and knowing when one is “in it”), the major difficulty with this explanation is that highly personalized organizations often emerge under exceedingly “normal” conditions. Powerful personal loyalties to leaders may develop in the absence of a serious crisis.

The Weberian notion of crisis is not the only explanation available in the contemporary literature. Others attribute personalism to constitutional arrangements that create strong executives, especially presidentialism. Competition for the presidency is said to encourage parties to put forward individuals with extraordinary popular appeal. Presidentialism therefore may generate pressures within parties for the emergence of a dominant, highly authoritative figure (Gaffney, 1989; Thiebault, 1993). In practice, however, personalist parties arise in semipresidential and parliamentary systems as well.

A third explanation asserts that modern technologies of communication—and television in particular—encourage personalization (Epstein, 1967, pp. 239-240; Panebianco, 1988, pp. 266-267). This argument may have some merit for explaining a heightened emphasis on the personal qualities of political figures, but it fails as an explanation for the leadership structure of parties and of noncharismatic personalist parties in particular. First, personalism is scarcely a recent phenomenon. Neither Gladstone nor Disraeli faced the challenge of “sound byte” politics, but both enjoyed great personal authority within their parties. Second, even if television accentuates personality, it does not necessarily enable a single person to achieve dominance. In fact, television can help an ambitious rival within a party to challenge the top leader by going directly to the public, circumventing party structures and procedures. It
therefore may proliferate challenges to domination by a single individual rather than reinforce his or her preeminence. Finally, the media-effects hypothesis would lead us to expect leaders of personalist parties to be engaging, articulate, telegenic figures. But this often is not the case. Leaders of non-charismatic personalist parties usually lack compelling public images.

In sum, theories that focus on crisis, presidentialism, or media effects do not furnish satisfactory general explanations of personalism; nor do they yield a great deal of insight into specific forms of personalist leadership. We do not offer a fully general theory of the emergence of personalism in political organizations. We regard such an effort as premature, especially given the loose and unsystematic use of the concept of "personalism" frequently found in scholarly writings and the popular press. Given the limited state of understanding of personalism at the present time, we view an approach that identifies and explains specific forms of personalism as a fruitful strategy for theory building. Our work may eventually contribute to advancing a more universal theory of personalism, one that grapples with its nascence and persistence—contrary to the expectations of most variants of modernization theory—even in parties in advanced industrialized democracies. Below we offer an explanation for the emergence of the specific forms of personalism identified above and explicated in Table 2. Our main theoretical and empirical discussion focuses on one particular type of organization, the noncharismatic personalist political party.

**EXPLAINING NONCHARISMATIC PERSONALISM**

Our explanation centers on parties as organizations. We focus particularly on the character of internal conflict within the party between rival factions, tendencies, or subunits. We are well aware that internal conflicts often reflect broader societal cleavages as well as elite disunity, especially at the level of multiparty governing coalitions. We regard internal party conflict, however, as the critical proximate variable explaining the character of party leadership. The form of leadership reflects the type of cleavages that divide the party internally.

We identify two broad types of division commonly observed in parties: territorial cleavages and ideological cleavages. The former are found when local or regional sections compete for influence within the organization. The presence of "strongmen" with their own territorially based followings con-duce the formation of such cleavages. Ideological cleavages are present when tendencies or factions develop around programmatic commitments, which may reflect differences in political philosophy, religious
identification, generational membership, or positions on strategic issues. Territorial and ideological cleavages may overlap (when certain regions have distinct programmatic preferences) or cut across each other (when ideological differences are not coterminous with territorial subunits).

Figure 1 summarizes our argument about how these cleavages influence the type of leadership authority that is most likely to emerge within parties. Patronage-based leadership is likely when territorial cleavages are salient but ideological ones are not. Quasi-charismatic leadership is likely to emerge in the opposite case, when ideological divisions are salient but territorial ones are not. Charismatic leadership is found only in parties divided by neither territorial nor ideological cleavages. Noncharismatic personalism arises when parties are divided both territorially and ideologically. We will consider the logic of these arguments.

A situation characterized by weak ideological cleavages and strong territorial ones means that leaders can rule sections of the party semi-autonomously, and their power and position in the national leadership organs will derive from their control over party resources and activists within a given section of the party. This situation conduces the emergence of patronage-based leadership. Some ideological differences may be present among leaders of such a party, but these are normally overwhelmed by nonprogrammatic distinctions rooted in territorial interests. When ideological conflict is highly salient and territorial division is not, party unity may be threatened. If the party holds together, it often does so by means of the triumph of one of the rival factions, which subsequently predominates. The leader of the triumphant group under such conditions often emerges as a quasi-charismatic
leader. He or she is regarded within the party as a principled, fearless, and unwavering fighter for all that the party (or the party’s predominant tendency) represents. In both cases, conflicts are based in intermediary structures within the party—territorial subunits and ideological factions. Charismatic leadership, by contrast, emerges in conditions where such structures are weak or nonexistent. Charismatic leaders stand “above party” and membership in the party is defined by unmediated devotion to the leader. Loyalty to intermediary groups within the party can emerge only when charisma fails or is routinized.

Finally, noncharismatic personalist leadership emerges when a party has both territorial and ideological cleavages. The existence of both types of cleavage—especially if they are crosscutting—normally makes each of the forms of leadership discussed above difficult to sustain. Territorial cleavages may be brokered through skillful use of patronage, but ideological factions are unlikely to be assuaged through side payments. An ideologically committed crusader may rally the party around a clear-cut set of programmatic ideals but will not then enjoy the political flexibility to cut the deals that grease the wheels of patronage politics. In contrast with the situation leading to charismatic leadership, subgroup loyalties are well developed and threaten at any time to displace party loyalty. In these circumstances, the successful leader must constantly play the negotiator and conciliator, the balancer among tendencies and groups. He or she must deal with territorial divisions and cannot, unlike the leader of a party divided only along ideological lines, simply “win” a factional struggle based on divergent programmatic principles and impose a vision on the party. Yet, since principles “matter” enough to party activists to cause real conflict, the leader must “stand for something”; he or she cannot be seen merely as an unprincipled opportunist. That “something,” however, must be an eclectic and flexible mix; the leader must avoid being “locked in” to a position too closely associated with any one faction.

The sources of legitimacy and power of these various forms of party leadership may be summarized as follows. Patronage-based leaders rely on control over the critical patronage resources necessary for intraparty bargaining. The quasi-charismatic leader achieves stature by representing a distinct ideological tendency and maintaining that tendency’s ascendance within the party. The charismatic leader also symbolizes a set of moral ends, but the purity of these ends demands that he or she remain “above party.” The noncharismatic leader derives authority from remaining “above faction” while preserving the strategic flexibility needed to manage and reconcile internal party divisions.

In explicating the organizational conditions that correlate with certain patterns of leadership, we have articulated a falsifiable theory. Internal party
cleavages are readily observable, making it possible to judge whether the conditions on which our explanation rests are present or not. Nevertheless, our argument is probabilistic rather than deterministic. We argue that these conditions are “likely to promote” the emergence of a particular type of leadership, not that they “always produce” it.

To understand fully when and whether noncharismatic personalism will appear, it is necessary to consider both the “demand” for and the “supply” of such leadership. Neither demand nor supply arises automatically, and both must be present in order for the type of leadership authority we discuss to arise.

There is no guarantee that parties divided along ideological and territorial lines will hold together. They may stumble on, chronically rent by internal cleavages; divide into several new organizations; or dissolve and disappear. But many members may have a strong interest in overcoming divisions. Some level of internal conflict can be sustained without jeopardizing the party’s electoral appeal. Yet, as Alan Ware (1987) argues, beyond a certain threshold of intensity, internal conflict renders an organization “much less credible as a governing party and its electoral prospects can be reduced” (p. 158). Thus, office-seeking politicians in the party may seek to avoid overly intense factionalization or outright dissolution. Leaders of regional organizations who control resources that might evaporate if the party breaks down, as well as activists who enjoy the moral, material, or solidarity benefits that accrue from membership, also may desire to hold the organization together. Their interests create demand for overcoming divisions.

Demand for organizational preservation and prosperity does not inexorably create the “supply” (or availability) of a leader capable of delivering it. Such a leader may or may not emerge. Noncharismatic personalist leadership requires the presence of an individual with a certain mix of talents and perhaps even a distinctive biography.

Mention of several exemplars of our categories may help flesh out the typology. The Italian Christian Democratic Party during much of its history exemplified the patronage-based party. Programmatic differences were submerged in territorial divisions. The party’s factional structure was dominated by patrons who mobilized and rewarded activists in their provinces—even as the party underwent “modernization” and began to practice forms of “new clientelism” in the 1960s and 1970s (Eisenstadt & Lemarchand, 1981; Zuckerman, 1979). Hitler’s Nazis obviously constituted a charismatic party. Examples of quasi-charismatic parties include Britain’s Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher and the U.S. Republican Party under Ronald Reagan. In the late 1970s, neither party was divided deeply along territorial lines but both possessed a clear cleavage between moderate and far-Right
tendencies. Both parties were taken over by activists from the latter group, led and symbolized by Thatcher and Reagan respectively. Neither of these leaders was “charismatic” in the strict sense. Nevertheless, each embodied a set of strong and readily identifiable principles and enjoyed measures of authority and personal appeal that led to frequent colloquial use of the term charismatic to describe their leadership.

Organizations that may be regarded as noncharismatic personalist parties include the German Christian Democratic Union under Helmut Kohl, the French Socialist Party under François Mitterrand, and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation under Gennadii Ziuganov. Detailed examination of these parties and their leaders will help to illustrate noncharismatic personalism and to explicate the conceptual, typological, and theoretical issues under discussion.

**HELMUT KOHL AND THE VIRTUES OF FINGERSPITZENGEFÜHL**

Neither intellectual nor media darling nor simple patronage boss, Helmut Kohl secured a degree of personal authority within the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) that allowed him to surpass Konrad Adenauer in the longevity of his tenure as German chancellor. The basis for Kohl’s success lay in his remarkable talent as an “integrator” and a “mediator” (Smith, 1989, p. 69). Even before winning the party chairmanship in 1973, Kohl had staked out a role as equilibrator and as linchpin of party unity (Pruys, 1996, p. 54). When the party was torn by internal strife, Kohl consistently managed to embody the party itself rather than a tendency or a faction.

Kohl’s personal limitations support the notion that his brand of control was ultimately associated with internal party divisions rather than with the effects of modern media. Kohl’s media style and oratorical skills were—at best—undistinguished and unsophisticated, although he was sometimes seen in a positive light as “jocular” or “self-effacing” (Clemens, 1994, pp. 38-39). Nor can what is sometimes called the “chancellor effect”—the advantages accruing from holding the chancellorship—explain Kohl’s domination of his party (see Jäger, 1988). Tellingly, the two CDU chancellors between Adenauer and Kohl failed to consolidate their hold over the party. Furthermore, Kohl never provided the CDU with a strong “chancellor bonus”—that is, the long electoral coattails of an appealing chancellor candidate. As

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5. *Fingerspitzengefühl* refers to a “fingertip feel”—in Kohl’s case, for politics and organization.
Clemens (1994) notes, “Alone among postwar chiefs of government, Kohl often could not be relied upon to attract extra support for his party” (pp. 37-38; also S. Padgett, 1994, pp. 69, 75). Kohl unquestionably used the resources available to the chancellor to enhance his standing in the party; however, he actually consolidated his position in the party even before becoming chancellor in 1982.

The demand for a Helmut Kohl within the CDU stemmed from conflicts within the party and within the broader party system. Angelo Panebianco (1988) has noted that the CDU emerged through a process of “territorial diffusion, in its purest form”—that is, out of a federation of largely autonomous regional party organizations led by local notables. The early postwar CDU had an extremely weak organizational center and existed mainly at the level of the Länder (states). It held together primarily through support for Adenauer. The regional organizations, as Panebianco notes, were “veritable autonomous fiefdoms, able to successfully ward off ‘central’ party interference.” Despite Adenauer’s national prominence, regional leaders were still the “true party bosses” (Panebianco, 1988, pp. 116, 120, 122).

Territorial divisions were compounded by confessional rivalries between Catholics and Protestants. In fact, the regional division between the CDU and its “sister” party in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (CSU), reflected the strength of Catholicism in Bavaria. From its inception, the CDU had to maintain a delicate balancing act in preserving the coalition between Protestants and Catholics. There also existed a cleavage between a labor wing and employer wing of the party. These divisions were sometimes reinforcing and sometimes crosscutting (S. Padgett, 1994, pp. 48-50; Panebianco, 1988, p. 115).

Another salient—perhaps the most divisive—cleavage in the party during the period leading up to Kohl’s rise centered on East-West relations. At the end of the 1960s, the governing coalition of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) initiated Ostpolitik (foreign policy toward the Eastern bloc), which involved negotiation with, and recognition of, the German Democratic Republic (GDR). “Fundamentalists” in the CDU rejected Ostpolitik as intolerable acquiescence in the division of Germany. This position was strong among Catholics in the South and conservative Protestants in the North. “Reformists” in the party did not embrace all aspects of the SPD-FDP program on Ostpolitik, but they did favor greater normalization of relations with the GDR. The “reformists” figured prominently among young CDU members and in urban-industrial areas of northern Germany and the Rhineland, where trade unions were strong. The dispute for a time paralyzed the party and threatened to split it. Although the
fundamentalists formed a majority in the party, their position was out of line with more moderate public opinion (Clemens, 1989, pp. 62-66, 105, 109).

Clemens’s (1989) discussion illuminates Kohl’s style of leadership:

Kohl’s own ideas on Ostpolitik remained largely platitudinous. His real contribution to a more adaptive Union [CDU] policy lay in his political strategy, which was in turn the more-or-less indirect result of his concern with preserving the Union’s tenuous unity while moving the party toward power—preferably in coalition with the FDP. . . . In his effort to preserve the internal Union consensus while identifying with a broader majority in the country, Kohl created an atmosphere in which two policies could coexist in party thinking and rhetoric. (p. 257)

Kohl fostered strategic flexibility by insisting that regional organizations of the CDU/CSU retain the right to define their own positions on Ostpolitik. This allowed some Länder organizations to promise support for FDP positions in a manner that drew the FDP toward closer ties with portions of the CDU. Fundamentalists objected to granting Land organizations an independent voice. But Kohl worked to maintain Land discretion (Clemens, 1989, p. 163).

Kohl’s stance enabled him to promote a strategy designed to woo the FDP away from its coalition with the SPD without alienating the CDU’s Bavarian sister party, the CSU. In the early and mid-1970s, the CDU was caught between the animosity of the CSU toward the FDP and the enticing opportunities presented by a possible breakdown in the coalition between the SPD and the FDP. Without FDP support the CDU was unlikely to gain the opportunity to form a governing coalition. But when the CDU moved toward the center, the CSU threatened to expand outside its regional base and become a national party. By positioning himself in the middle of the CDU, Kohl became the Archimedean point between the CSU on the Right and the FDP on the Left (Barton, 1984; Clemens, 1994, p. 40).

Several features of Kohl’s career were important for understanding his ability to position himself as the impresario of organizational integration. Kohl’s rise in the CDU was slow and deliberate. It corresponded with several major changes occurring within the organization. Kohl was associated with a generational change in the CDU and a shift in organizing strategies. Younger CDU activists sought to bolster the weak and decentralized federal party organization to create a counterweight to the parliamentary Fraktion (parliamentary party). Kohl portrayed himself as the spearhead of a movement to reform the extraparliamentary organization of the party. The reform effort produced a major turning point in the life of the CDU, involving a doubling of the party’s membership in the early and mid-1970s. Panebianco (1988) notes
that the massive inflow of new members “upset all internal party relations” (p. 259). Yet, Kohl’s association with the reformers in the party went only so far. As *Rheinischer Merkur* wrote when Kohl headed the party in the Rhineland-Palatinate: “Helmut Kohl is among the few ‘reformers’ in the CDU who do not react nervously and with annoyance when the word ‘conservative’ is mentioned” (cited in Pruys, 1996, p. 51). Clemens (1994) notes that Kohl sought to transform the party without “infringing on the role of ‘established notables'” (p. 41).

Kohl’s rise was facilitated—inadvertently—by two men: Rainer Barzel, a leader of the Left tendency, and Franz Josef Strauss, head of the CSU. Barzel was a Catholic who enjoyed support among the trade unions and youth, and he tilted in favor of Ostpolitik. He sought to use his position on Ostpolitik to consolidate his control over the party. He tried to placate the “fundamentalists” by criticizing the details of the settlement with the GDR while moving the CDU toward de facto acceptance of Ostpolitik. In 1971, Barzel appeared close to consolidating his leadership: He had become leader of the Fraktion, party chairman, and the chancellor candidate. But Barzel’s clear support for Ostpolitik policies, combined with his approach to party organization, opened space for Kohl to challenge his leadership. Whereas Barzel identified himself explicitly with a particular tendency, Kohl skillfully straddled the fence on Ostpolitik and other divisive issues.

Kohl’s positions also strengthened his hand in grappling with a challenge from the Right in the person of Strauss, the leader of the CSU. Strauss was a key figure in Kohl’s rise. He “made” Kohl in much the same way that we will show that Guy Mollet “made” Mitterrand. Strauss was everything that Kohl was not: colorful, outspoken, and divisive. In 1976, Strauss and Kohl battled to become the CDU’s chancellor candidate. Kohl not only won the candidacy but he solidified his hold on the party chairmanship, scoring a convincing victory in his bid for reelection. However, Strauss’s most important role in consolidating Kohl’s position was still yet to be played.

Clemens (1989) provides a good summary of Kohl’s position at the time:

> Despite a good showing in 1976 and his double role as CDU chairman and opposition parliamentary chief, doubts persisted about his leadership. Kohl’s efforts to accommodate the FDP fell afoul of party conservatives and Union politicians across the spectrum increasingly felt a more dynamic opposition figure would be needed to unseat [Helmut] Schmidt as chancellor. (p. 175)

From his solid but not yet commanding position, Kohl’s star would have to fall before it would rise. In 1978, complex factional infighting broke out that directly threatened Kohl’s control over both the party organization and the
parliamentary Fraktion. The attack on Kohl was led by his erstwhile ally, Kurt Biedenkopf, then Land chairman in Westphalia. By the spring of 1979, Kohl’s stock had sunk to a low point, and factions began promoting one of their own as chancellor candidate. The left wing put forward Ernst Albrecht, minister-president of Lower Saxony, whereras the CSU backed Strauss. The latter won the position as chancellor candidate in 1979. In a move that lent much credibility to Kohl’s loyalty to the party, Kohl strongly supported Strauss’s candidacy. Fortunately for Kohl’s career, the results of the general election, held in 1980, did not produce a major breakthrough for the CDU/CSU and Strauss failed to unseat the SPD’s Schmidt as chancellor. The party could not hope to win control of the government if it tilted too far to the Right. Nor could it tolerate internal polarization. The combination of the election results and the strains arising from internal divisions opened the way for Kohl to establish dominance, which he began to do shortly after the election.

Kohl consolidated his control not only by establishing himself as the indispensable “center” of the party but also by painstakingly nurturing an extensive network of loyalists at all levels, including and especially in the Land organizations. Kohl exemplifies the tendency of noncharismatic personalist leaders consistently to be at the center of intra- and extraparty networks of decision making. As Clemens (1994) explains, Kohl confers with “many, often overlapping but not interchangeable circles of elites, and—as a result—was often the only one who knew what had been or could be agreed to.” Kohl thereby came to preside over “a generally consensus-oriented, but—paradoxically—far from collective, decision-making process based mainly on his own intuition and induction” (pp. 34, 42-46). Even after becoming chancellor in 1982, Kohl continued to attend Land-level congresses and to cultivate Land- and district-level activists. He did so through direct personal contact, circumventing the national party bureaucracy that Land organizations have frequently distrusted for its “centralizing” tendencies. Consequently, “formal organizational links between the CDU headquarters and the regional, district, and local levels of the party were still largely informal, mediated by the party chairman” (S. Padgett, 1994, p. 71). Kohl thus established himself by the mid-1980s not only as the party’s unquestioned leader but also as the embodiment of the party itself. In October 1996, he was reelected at the CDU annual conference with 96% of the vote—prompting The Economist magazine to quip that Kohl “has made the CDU look like an assembly of yes-men” (“Helmut Kohl,” 1996).

Although Kohl fared poorly in the 1998 elections, his departure from active party politics demonstrated his continued hold on the CDU: His hand-picked successor, Wolfgang Schauble, became the new leader of the CDU virtually without opposition.
François Mitterrand and the Pyramid of Antagonisms

François Mitterrand may be described as the personal embodiment of all the contradictions of modern French politics. He started his prewar political career on the Right and after a flirtation with Pétain joined the resistance. During the Fourth Republic he led his own small party that stood just barely to the left of center, but a strategic alliance with the communists later helped bring him to the pinnacle of his success. He came from a conservative Catholic background but became the leader of a historically anticlerical party. He initially opposed the presidentialism of the Fifth Republic but later became president.

These contradictions were not simply a part of Mitterrand’s biography; they were ingrained in his character. As one biographer, Catherine Nay (1987), writes: “No sooner has he formulated a thesis than he maintains, in his own manner, the antithesis” (p. 315).

Mitterrand’s contradictions made him a perfect reflection of the French Left during the 1960s and 1970s. In 1971, the disparate forces of the French noncommunist Left joined together to form the modern French Socialist Party (PS). Mitterrand, who had withheld his support from the failed projects of the ralliement (rally) in 1969-1970, was catapulted to the leadership of the new party by a “most heterogeneous alliance” (Bell & Criddle, 1988, p. 61). The PS cobbled together factions from four existing parties (the Radicals, the Radical Socialists, the Unified Socialist Party [PSU], and the main traditional socialist party, the SFIO), a variety of independent political clubs, and a broad federation of parties and clubs. Until 1971, these groups were deeply divided over, among other issues, whether to create a leftist popular front including the French Communist Party (PCF) or a center-left coalition excluding the PCF. Mitterrand, as a visible and popular but essentially independent leader of the Left, overcame the rift by appealing to proponents of both strategies. In the same way that Kohl positioned himself as the central mediator between the CSU and the FDP, Mitterrand made himself the indispensable link in a strategy that united Radicals on the Right with communists on the Left.

The consolidation of Mitterrand’s personal leadership within the PS is a story of reconciling and pulling together the disparate ideological and organizational currents that divided the French Left during the 1960s. The story begins with the creation of a political club movement in the early 1960s that attempted to rejuvenate political debate outside the sclerotic structures of existing leftist parties. Mitterrand himself became the leader of the Convention Préparatoire des Institutions Républicaines (CIR), a federation of clubs...
that supported his unsuccessful candidacy for president in 1965. From the start, Mitterrand owed his status in this movement to a delicate balancing act. Although it was often regarded as "anti-clerical," the CIR under Mitterrand cultivated a Catholic wing by embracing a major Catholic club, Citoyen 60, and by welcoming many individual Catholics into CIR chapters in the provinces. Mitterrand’s association during the Fourth Republic with the traditionally anticlerical Radicals, combined with his own well-known Catholic background, helped him to manage tensions within the CIR between Catholics and the Radicals.

At about the same time, Mitterrand also became the leader of a loose umbrella federation of left-wing parties and clubs, the Fédération de la Gauche Démocrate et Socialiste (FGDS), the precursor to the refounded Socialist Party. Mitterrand owed this position in part to his ability to use the CIR to broker between the major federation of Catholic clubs, led by Alain Savary, and the main federation of Marxist clubs, headed by Jean Poperen, in much the same way that he united Catholic and anticlerical wings within the CIR itself. Mitterrand also capitalized on his status as an “outsider,” one deeply involved in leftist politics but officially outside the “traditional” parties (the SFIO, the PCF, the PSU, and the Radicals). The FGDS was built on a set of crosscutting antagonisms. One major generator of cleavage was Guy Mollet, the powerful and parochial head of the traditional socialist party, the SFIO. Mollet was widely viewed both inside and outside the SFIO as a major obstacle to a more unified Left. Mollet was to Mitterrand what Franz Josef Strauss was to Helmut Kohl (Bell & Criddle, 1988, p. 30; Cellard, 1990, p. 322; Pudlowski, 1975; Wilson, 1971).

In the period leading up to the consolidation of the new PS in 1971, three major groups allied themselves with Mitterrand. All three opposed Mollet. Two were territorial fiefdoms that together constituted the lion’s share of the resources and membership of the SFIO. One was the Nord federation, led by Pierre Mauroy. Mauroy had been groomed as Mollet’s successor but was then passed over for the general secretariatship of the SFIO. His consequent disgruntlement with Mollet led Mauroy to ally himself with Mitterrand. Mitterrand also forged an alliance with Gaston Deferre, the powerful boss of the Bouches-du-Rhône federation of the SFIO. Deferre had a long-standing rivalry with Mollet. There was no possibility of refounding the Socialist Party without these two powerful territorial federations, both of which were

6. As Panebianco (1988) notes, the structure of the main traditional socialist party (SFIO) consisted of “highly independent intermediate structures, viz. the federations, immediately organized into autonomous fiefdoms strong enough to stave off the center’s attempts to interfere” (p. 97). It is interesting to note the resemblance to the pre-Kohl Christian Democratic Union (CDU).
located on the center-right of the SFIO. Mitterrand created a third alliance with a vigorous left-wing ideological faction within the SFIO, the Centre d’Études, de Recherches, et d’Éducation Socialiste (CERES), which was a budding mass movement in its own right. In contrast to the territorial federations led by Mauroy and Deferre, this group advocated a pact with the communists. Relations between the territorial federations and CERES were uneasy, but they shared a common hostility toward Mollet. Mitterrand used this “visceral anti-Molletism” to “cement” the PS together at the congress of Epinay in 1971 (Serne, 1993, pp. 179-185). The new PS melded the club movement and the old SFIO, appropriating the latter’s organizational structure—and inheriting its internal conflicts—largely intact.

Mitterrand’s own personal coterie within the new PS was extremely diverse ideologically. As Nay (1987) writes, Mitterrand “is (and always has been) the core of a circle that exists only for and because of him. Actually, there are several circles, each alien to the other, of whose subtle interrelationships he is a sensitive but tyrannical master” (p. 295; see also Bell & Criddle, 1988, pp. 221, 230). Mitterrand’s coterie included former supporters of Mollet and Savary, as well as loyalists from the CIR. By 1973, Mitterrand had managed to bring Popereen and his left-wing ideologues into the PS and his inner circle as well. Ideologically, the Mitterrandists ranged from the far Left to the far Right of the party—from Marxist theoreticians such as Popereen to pragmatic technocrats such as Edith Cresson.

As first secretary of the PS in the 1970s, Mitterrand made himself the fulcrum between ideological poles, and in particular between the powerful territorial federations led by Mauroy and Deferre on the center-right of the party and CERES on the Left (Bergounioux & Grunberg, 1992, chap. 15; Hanley, 1986, p. 51; Sferza, 1996). He insisted on a common electoral front between the PS—including of course its own right wing, represented by the territorial organizations of the old SFIO—and the PCF. His strategy resembled Kohl’s brokerage and alliance building between the CSU on the Right and the FDP on the Left (and outside of) the CDU. Like Kohl, Mitterrand proved highly adept at forging alliances between diverse forces and then making himself the indispensable figure in maintaining those same coalitions. He also built an organizational structure that enabled him to manage diversity. As Roland Cuyrol (1978) observed, a proliferation of offices in the PS headquarters both incorporated representatives from all tendencies into bureaucratic positions and allowed for the creation of a dual hierarchy through which Mitterrand exercised his personal influence. During the 1970s, Mitterrand established a managerial regime that William Schonfeld (1985) described as “monocratic,” with Mitterrand at its pinnacle.
Mitterrand’s own ambiguous background, relationships, and commitments helped make him a masterful practitioner of “robust action,” convincing diverse and even mutually antagonistic audiences that he best represented their interests and aspirations. Bell and Criddle (1988) note, “The word most often used to describe François Mitterrand is ‘enigmatic.’ Despite a long and distinguished political career it is difficult to discern any guiding principle” (pp. 233-235). Throughout the 1970s, Mitterrand engaged in complex factional balancing within the PS. Only Michel Rocard’s challenge in the late 1970s threatened to make the Mitterrandists merely one of several factions. But Mitterrand deflected Rocard’s bid and united the party behind his own successful 1981 presidential campaign. After his election, Mitterrand’s primacy in the party was never in doubt, even as he sometimes held—or at least pretended to hold—the party at arm’s length during his presidency.

GENNADII ZIUGANOV AND THE ART OF PROGRAMMATIC FUSION

In a perceptive recent analysis, Veljko Vujacic (1996) noted, “When Gennadii Ziuganov first made his silent appearance on the Russian political scene in mid-1990, few could have predicted that this obscure party apparatchik would become a leading contestant in Russia’s presidential elections a mere six years later” (p. 129). Fewer still could have anticipated that in less than half that time, Ziuganov, then deputy head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee ideology department, would lead Russia’s largest and strongest political party. His leadership, like that of Kohl and Mitterrand, would assume the form of noncharismatic personalism.

The origins of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) stretch back to the spring of 1990, when many orthodox members of the CPSU in Russia who opposed Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of liberalization formed the Communist Party of the RSFSR. Ziuganov became the ideological secretary of what amounted to a conservative branch of the CPSU. Following the failed putsch of August 1991 that brought down the Soviet regime, Ziuganov began organizing a new, post-Soviet communist party. Among those who sought to build a new party, Ziuganov was particularly zealous in his pursuit of ties with “patriotic”—but often noncommunist—forces, thus establishing himself early on as a point man in extraparty networks of communication with potential allies. He became chairman of the Coordinating Council of Patriotic Forces in early 1992 and spent much of the year cultivating ties with the nationalist opposition (Vujacic, 1996, pp. 136-138).
At the time of its founding, the CPRF leadership composed what one leading Russian scholar has called “the most diverse elements,” including distinctly “red” (traditional communist) and “white” (nationalist) forces, as well as a diminutive social-democratic tendency (Markov, 1996, p. 16). Even before the party’s founding, Ziuganov positioned himself as the primogenitor of a new ideological fusion. On the eve of the party’s birth, he articulated his vision of a new left-wing party that would embody the communist ideal of social justice, but that would also embrace age-old Russian traditions of national messianism, statism, and spiritualism (Scanlan, 1996, pp. 38-41; Vujacic, 1996, p. 140). Ziuganov’s programmatic cocktail proved a winning mix at the party’s founding conference, where he was elected general secretary over his main rival, Valentin Kuptsov, whom several hard-line delegates accused of softness on “Gorbachevism.” For his own part, Kuptsov took over as first deputy chairman of the party, effectively becoming Ziuganov’s chief lieutenant for organizational matters (Federal’noe Sobranie, 1995, p. 144).

During the next half-decade, Ziuganov explicated a set of principles that mirrored and expressed every conceivable source of dissatisfaction that existed within the CPRF regarding the postcommunist order. In a polity where democracy itself is highly tenuous, where even the most basic questions of political and social order remain unsettled, and where most politicians appear concerned with little more than personal enrichment, Ziuganov’s attention to ideology and program enhance his stature and personal credibility. His efforts included authoring several books. Ziuganov has extolled the Russian Orthodox Church and its role in promoting national spiritual unification. Yet, he has never renounced his own personal atheism, thus avoiding alienating the communist old guard that constitutes a large portion of the CPRF’s stalwarts (“Ob’edinim siia,” 1996; Scanlan, 1996, p. 38; Ziuganov, 1994, p. 33). He has regularly reassured his party that he will never depart from a “class approach” and has stated repeatedly that “capitalist property will exhaust itself” (“Kommunisty nameriny,” 1995). While never embracing the term “social-democratic” to describe himself or his party’s program, Ziuganov has periodically mentioned his own “social-democratic goals” (“Ziuganov Defends Himself,” 1996). Combined with his red (and occasionally “pink”) politics, Ziuganov (1994) has added a large measure of what he explicitly extolled as the “‘white’ ideal of nationally conceived statehood, understood as the form of existence of the centuries-old sacred ideals of the people, [by which] Russia will obtain, finally, the long craved-for societal consensus of all strata and classes and supreme state power” (p. 33). In 1995, Ziuganov brought under party sponsorship Aleksei Podberezkin’s “Spiritual Heritage,” a think tank dedicated to developing a statist, nationalist, and even mystical notion of the “Russian idea.” Ziuganov (1995)
forcefully advocates a state in which ethnic Russians, long abused in his view by “cosmopolitans” (Jews) and other minorities as well as by the West and international capital, will assume their rightful place as the masters of their own land (pp. 48-62, 145-176). Ziu ganov’s rhetoric, although frequently nostalgic in tone, has included quasi-visionary references to a future, communist-led “breakthrough to the 21st century” and to the importance of grasping the logic of the “postindustrial age” (“Krolikov oznakomili,” 1996). Ziu ganov’s role as author and ideological inventor has enhanced his authority in a party in which “theory” matters.

In tactical and operational terms Ziu ganov has consistently managed to satisfy both the “irreconcilables” who totally reject the new regime and activists who regard parliamentarism and peaceful struggle as the only feasible options. Ziu ganov has embraced electoral politics and has not refused contact with liberal parties. Yet, to preempt the crystallization of dissatisfaction with his tactical flexibility among the most belligerent elements in the CPRF, he has regularly alerted the government—and members of his own party—to his vehement intrasigence. In April 1997, for example, he warned the government that it had better tread lightly in its relations with his party, lest the events of October 1993 (the bloody showdown in which President Boris Yeltsin crushed a putsch attempt led by supporters of the conservative, holdover Supreme Soviet) soon repeat themselves—but with the opposite outcome (Ekho Moskvy, April 11, 1997).

In an enormous and diverse country in which the central government’s authority has eroded in favor of the regions, it is unsurprising that a party that encompasses remnants of the old hegemonic ruling structure includes not only a range of ideological tendencies but also territorial organizations led by regional barons with substantial power bases. The west-central black-earth region is home to a number of leaders who boast a personal following. Ziu ganov himself is from Orel Oblast’, in the heart of this region.

Anatolii Luk’ianov, the Gorbachev-era Supreme Soviet chairman who now chairs the powerful Committee on the Budget in the Duma (the lower house of parliament), was elected in 1993 and again in 1995 from a single-member district (SMD) from his hometown of Smolensk. Viktor Iliukhin, the chairman of the Duma’s Committee on Security, was similarly twice elected from an SMD from Penza. Both Luk’ianov, a representative of the traditional “red” tendency, and Iliukhin, a vehement nationalist, enjoy great popularity among party members in their regions. In the northwest, Iurii Belov, the St. Petersburg party leader who won an SMD seat in 1995, enjoys a personal base of support among communists in his city and its environs.

Siberia is also home to several leaders with strong regional support. Viktor Zorkal’tsev, a leader of the “social-democratic” tendency in the party and
chairman of the Duma’s Committee on the Affairs of Social and Religious Organizations, has deep roots in Tomsk Oblast, where he was the regional CPSU first secretary during the Gorbachev period. Aman Tuleev, who occupied the third position on the CPRF’s list in 1995 and who ran for president as the party’s “reserve candidate” in 1996, only to withdraw in favor of Ziuganov several weeks before the election, was a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU and a provincial party official during the Soviet era. Since 1993 he has represented his home region of Kemerovo oblast in the Soviet of the Federation (the upper house of parliament). Despite strained relations with some party leaders, he boasts great authority among rank-and-file Siberian communists, particularly in the Kuzbass coal-mining region.7

The regional bases enjoyed by these leaders and ideological tendencies are crosscutting; consistent programmatic differences are not present in particular regional sections of the party. This pattern of cleavages has helped Ziuganov thwart threats to his leadership, because no rival can readily challenge him by mobilizing a section of the party based on both a collection of regional sections and a particular ideological tendency. At the same time, the presence of regional strongmen has encouraged Ziuganov to maintain a high degree of engagement in organizational matters.

Indeed, in the realm of personnel management and party building, Ziuganov’s behavior is best characterized by what Vujacic (1996) calls his “organizational zeal and relentless activism” (p. 138). Ziuganov has attended scrupulously to the needs of other CPRF leaders. One of the top staff members of the party’s parliamentary fraction has remarked that “Ziuganov always consults with others” (V. Akimov, personal communication, August 7, 1996). Ziuganov has also tirelessly pursued party unity, even as he has pulled the CPRF into and out of several multiorganizational “blocs” of antigovernment forces. Rather than placing party unity and comity at risk by purging or marginalizing his potential rivals, he has embraced the practice of accommodating them and using them to advance his own aims. In personnel matters, Ziuganov has relied heavily on Kuptsov, who, despite his rivalry with Ziuganov at the time of the party’s founding, quickly became a staunch Ziuganov loyalist and a valuable source of organizational acumen. In organizational as well as ideological affairs, Ziuganov’s style has been marked by balancing, fusing, and co-opting, rather than by purging, splitting, and crusading.

Ziuganov’s remarkable ideological flexibility and creativeness, as well as his dogged commitment to party unity and organization building, enabled

7. Other party leaders with regional bases of support include Vladimir Volkov of Orenburg, Svetlana Goriacheva of Vladivostok, and Oleg Shenkarev of Bryansk (see Barsenkov, Koretskii, & Ostapenko, 1995; Markov 1996).
him to consolidate his position as the indispensable broker, as the leader who was least objectionable to all major tendencies in the party. Ziuganov certainly did not achieve his elevated status by dint of personal charm or oratorical skills. In an apt phrase that might apply equally well to Kohl at the time of the latter’s rise in the German CDU, Timothy Colton (1996) has noted that Ziuganov “is a colorless personality with few achievements outside of party politics to draw upon” (p. 376).

Perhaps the most telling testament to Ziuganov’s authority in the party was how he weathered his crushing defeat in the presidential election of mid-1996. The CPRF performed well in the December 1995 parliamentary election, and the presidential election in many respects was Ziuganov’s to lose. Ziuganov did secure a place in the runoff against Yeltsin, but he then lost it by a humiliating 14 percentage points. During the weeks prior to the election, when polls indicated that Yeltsin was pulling ahead, and especially after Ziuganov went down in defeat, the Russian press was awash with speculation on who would succeed Ziuganov as head of the CPRF. To be sure, the party leadership was not uniformly satisfied with his performance (“Communists in Despair,” 1996; “KPRF Official Denies Split,” 1996). Nevertheless, Ziuganov’s primacy was not seriously challenged, which did not surprise the many CPRF stalwarts who had decided well before the election that Ziuganov embodied the party in a way that no other leader could. Asked 1 week before the presidential vote whether Ziuganov’s position as general secretary would be at risk in the event of his loss, one leading activist from Saratov explained,

After the CPSU was banned in 1991, we rebuilt a powerful organization, a successor to the CPSU, with a presence in all major regions and cities. This feat was due in large part to Gennadii Andreevich Ziuganov. . . . Gennadii Andreevich is an exceptionally knowledgeable figure. He has a deep understanding of the major problems that confront our society and the party. . . . He forged alliances with patriotic forces. . . . He is the unquestioned leader of our party, and losing the election would do nothing to undermine his position. His position might even be stronger still in the future. (G. Turuntaev, personal communication, June 27, 1996)

Indeed, at the CPRF’s yearly congress in the spring of 1997, Ziuganov gained easy reconfirmation as general secretary.

In the meantime, nearly one-half decade after the founding of the CPRF, controversy over who the “real” Ziuganov is continues unabated. Is he an orthodox communist, a hard-core ethnic Russian chauvinist or even a fascist, a would-be “statist” modernizer, a social democrat, or a great power nationalist? Or is he simply a seeker of power? While observers in Russia and the
West continue to debate this matter, it is not so problematic among party activists themselves, most of whom see in Ziuganov a reflection and a vehicle for the expression of their aspirations and resentments—whether nostalgia for lost national glory, advocacy of the restoration of a command economy and resistance to de-industrialization, elimination of the inequalities associated with the new capitalism, hatred of the new rich or ethnic minorities at home, or enmity toward the West.

CONCLUSION

The three case studies presented above are drawn from a wide range of institutional, cultural, economic, and historical environments. The CDU and the PS are found in Western democracies with advanced industrial economies; the CPRF in a Eurasian country with a fledgling, tenuous democracy and a level of economic development that is on par with that of many Latin American countries. The constitutions of the polities cover a broad spectrum. The CDU emerged in a parliamentary system, the PS in a semipresidential system, and the CPRF under a presidential constitution. The historical experiences and political cultures of Germany, France, and Russia also diverge widely. Moreover, the parties themselves represent a broad range: One is center-right and Christian Democratic, the second center-left and socialist, the third communist. Yet, remarkable similarities mark the forms of leadership that emerged in the CDU, the PS, and the CPRF. Leadership of all three parties took (and in the CPRF continues to take) the form of noncharismatic personalism. Each party was (or is) headed by a leader who achieved personal authority through means that combined ideological flexibility and inventiveness with a tenacious commitment to organization building. Each leader made his way in politics by dint of sustained dedication to his party and its unity, and each came to personify his own party. None, however, may be considered particularly dynamic, engaging, or inspiring leaders.

All three leaders achieved extraordinary success in national politics. Kohl was the longest-serving German chancellor in the 20th century. He orchestrated the reunification of Germany. Mitterrand completed two terms as president of France before his death in 1996. Mitterrand and Kohl, as much or more than any other leaders, constructed the European Union, overseeing the century’s most successful experiment in international political and economic integration. Ziuganov has not, as of this writing, served as his country’s chief executive, and he may well never do so. Nonetheless, he has built by far the strongest political party in post-Soviet Russia and has devised an ideology
that resonates widely in an electorate severely straitened by the dislocations of massive social and economic upheaval.

In an age that pretends to thirst for great leadership, organizations and mass publics in the world’s major politics have usually chosen in practice to entrust real responsibility to notably ordinary individuals. However, one need not rely exclusively on some notion of a spirit or mentality of the times to explain the remarkable success of noncharismatic personalist political parties in the last quarter of the 20th century. More mundane factors help explain the phenomenon as well.

Noncharismatic personalist parties have an exceptional degree of latitude for public maneuver in advertising their programs and their positions. If a single leader—and particularly one whose own position is elastic and adaptable—can speak for the party without the need constantly to consult other party leaders, the party may achieve a degree of tactical flexibility not enjoyed by organizations with highly collegial decision-making procedures. Such flexibility may be especially valuable at a time when electorates have become increasingly fragmented and electoral constituencies more changeable and amorphous. During the 1980s and 1990s, the CDU, with its chairman who achieved a status within the party that enabled him readily to speak for the party in public fora, repeatedly outmaneuvered the SPD, with its collegial and more “democratic” modes of decision making. Noncharismatic personalist parties also may enjoy advantages over patronage-based parties, which lack a single highly authoritative leader and which depend heavily on resources that can be distributed as patronage by party bosses. The loss of predominance in government and thus of access to public largess threatens such parties with severe strain or even extinction, as is shown by the experience of Italy’s Christian Democratic Party in the early 1990s. Noncharismatic personalist parties may even hold some advantages over quasi-charismatic parties. Leadership of the latter tends to be more “program promoting” than “party conserving,” which may work well as long as the party’s (and its leader’s) ideology are ascendant in the polity as a whole. But when the public appeal of the party’s ideology falters, the party may find itself in a deeper quandary than the more flexible noncharismatic personalist party. Kohl and Mitterrand and their parties weathered substantial shifts in public opinion during the 1980s, maintaining office even in times that seemed unfavorable for their reelectons. The constancy of the “face” of the CDU and the PS—however uninspiring it might have been—may have served both

8. Herbert Kitschelt attributes the electoral failures of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the 1980s in part to “low leadership autonomy.” Kitschelt (1994) also notes that the French Socialist Party (PS) under Mitterrand developed “high leadership autonomy,” which facilitated the party’s successes in the 1980s (pp. 207-253).
organizations well. The extent of long-term benefit that the CPRF will gain from Ziuganov’s leadership remains to be seen. But his maintenance of primacy between the parliamentary elections of 1993 and 1995, at a time when many other parties in Russia were racked by internal discord and leadership turnover, may well have contributed to the CPRF’s remarkably strong showing in the later contest.

Does the noncharismatic personalism of the CDU, PS, and CPRF imply that these parties are weak institutions? No, in fact, all three parties are reasonably strong institutions. All three present programs that furnish voters with distinct alternatives to their competitors in the electoral arena. All have bureaucratic apparatuses that include coherent organizations at the national, regional, and local levels. What is more, although all of the parties are (or were) closely identified with their leaders, and although those same leaders relied on their parties for their own political identities, the identities of the parties themselves are (or were), in fact, ultimately separable from the leader himself. Despite Mitterrand’s dominance of the PS, his party outlived him. Even though Kohl has dominated the CDU for two decades, few members of the party—or, for that matter, Germans in general—find it impossible to imagine a “post-Kohl CDU.” Ziuganov’s communists could carry on without him; his departure probably would not destroy the party. In this regard noncharismatic personalist parties diverge from charismatic parties, which rarely survive the demise of their leader. Indeed, our studies in noncharismatic personalism show the compatibility in organizational practice of a particular form of “personalism” and a high degree of “institutionalization.” They challenge the nearly universally held view of parties that places “programmatic” and “personalistic” organizations on poles of a continuum of “institutionalization,” with greater institutionalization associated axiomatically with less “personalization” and less proximity of identity between the leader and the organization.

It is important to note that parties can and often do change the character of their leadership during their careers. For example, the Italian Christian Democrats may well fit our profile of the noncharismatic personalist party during the period of Alcide De Gasperi’s secretaryship (1944-1954), but thereafter the organization clearly assumed the form of a patronage-based party. The Italian Communist Party (PCI), during most of the postwar period, was not highly personalized; indeed, in many respects it exemplified the nonpersonalist consensus-centered formal party. During the period of Enrico Berlinguer’s leadership during the 1970s and early 1980s, however, the PCI temporarily assumed the form of a quasi-charismatic party. Berlinguer represented a distinct ideological tendency, and his triumph within the party constituted a clear victory for the moderate wing over orthodox leftists.
Berlinguer’s forceful personal style, his clear representation of a particular programmatic line—he championed the “historic compromise” with the Christian Democrats over the opposition of the Left—and his widespread public popularity even outside the party (evidenced by the huge outpouring of public grief that followed his untimely death in 1984) marked him as what we would call a quasi-charismatic leader. The U.S. Democratic Party (like American political parties more generally) usually defies easy classification. In the mid-1960s, however, during the time of Lyndon Johnson’s presidency, the party in many respects resembled what we have conceptualized as the noncharismatic personalist party, with its dominant but uninspiring leader presiding over, and balancing among, diverse ideological and territorial tendencies. Some parties and their forms of leadership do not, of course, readily fit within one of our ideal-typical categories. We have not striven to provide a general theory that accounts for, and subsumes, every conceivable party and form of organization but rather to conceptualize, to depict, and to explain the basis for the emergence of one particular type of party. Our article, moreover, is not meant to be the last word on noncharismatic personalism. It aims instead to open the way to further theoretical and empirical work on a phenomenon that figures prominently in the political lives of contemporary democracies but that heretofore has received little systematic attention and has been only dimly understood.

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