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BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITARIANISM 93

1960s and the 1980s: Brazil from 1964 to 1985, Argentina from 1966 to 1973 and later from 1976 to 1983, Chile from 1973 to 1990, and Uruguay from 1973 to 1985. This body of analysis is closely identified with the writings of Guillermo O'Donnell.

Bureaucratic authoritarianism is a type of *military rule often interpreted as novel in relation to the earlier history of Latin America. It was generally led by the military as an institution, in contrast to the personalistic rule of individual officers. Rotation in the presidency among military leaders was a common, though not universal, trait. This form of rule has been interpreted as distinctively bureaucratic because national leadership was dominated by individuals who had risen to prominence not through political careers but through bureaucratic careers in large public and private organizations, including international agencies and transnational corporations. Decision-making styles among these leaders were commonly technocratic.

This bureaucratic, technocratic orientation was generally accompanied by intense repression, which in most of the cases reached levels unprecedented in the region. Repression was unleashed against the *labor movement, political parties associated with labor, and other social sectors whose prior mobilization had seemed to threaten the existing political and economic system.

The phenomenon of bureaucratic authoritarianism commanded wide analytic interest, in part because its emergence seemed to contradict the hypothesis that socioeconomic *modernization might be supportive of *democracy. In terms of per capita indicators, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay were among the most modernized countries in Latin America. Brazil was less modernized on a per capita basis, yet in absolute terms it had a large modern sector and its economic difficulties prior to the 1964 coup were in important respects those of an industrial economy. The appearance in these countries of an authoritarianism of unprecedented harshness thus challenged this earlier hypothesis.

Analysts explained this outcome by suggesting that the process of modernization had two consequences which collided: it intensified certain types of economic problems, and it augmented the capacity of the popular classes to resist an important spectrum of proposed solutions to these problems. It was argued that this collision increased pressures to inaugurate bureaucratic authoritarianism, as a means both of pursuing these proposed solutions and controlling resistance to them.

The rise of authoritarianism must be seen against the backdrop of abiding dilemmas in Latin American development: serious inequalities, which governments periodically sought to remedy through redistributive policies; inefficient industrial structures, sheltered from international competition by a high level of state protection which was strongly supported by a larger framework of economic *nationalism; and the contradictory role of labor movements that favored redistribution and protection. Latin America was able to confront governments when they abandoned such policies, and yet were often unable to enter coalitions that provided a stable basis for pursuing these policies.

The cases of bureaucratic authoritarianism shared a common approach to addressing these dilemmas. This approach included: (1) postponing redistribution, or even reversing it, in order to foster economic growth; (2) seeking to create a

BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITARIANISM. The concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism arose from the study of major episodes of authoritarian rule in South America between the

more efficient, internationally competitive economy and cultivating international economic actors as partners in the development model; and (3) attempting to control or destroy the labor movement, which in the past had often undermined these other policies. This policy mix had long been an option on the Latin American development agenda, and the initial success experienced by some of these new governments in implementing these policies commanded great attention, evoking both condemnation and praise.

The Concept. Bureaucratic authoritarianism has thus been understood as a form of bureaucratic and technocratic military rule that seeks to curtail popular mobilization and is built on a political coalition and a policy orientation that entails strong ties to international economic actors. It contrasts with *fascism, which is mobilizational and nationalistic. It lacks the comprehensive domination of *totalitarianism, notwithstanding the scope of repression in Chile and Uruguay, as well as Argentina in the 1970s. As a subtype of authoritarian rule, it may be distinguished from other subtypes: populist authoritarianism, which promotes popular mobilization rather than demobilization; and traditional authoritarianism, which is found prior to any extensive popular mobilization.

Bureaucratic authoritarianism is often referred to as a type of regime. Yet standard definitions of the term focus not just on what are conventionally thought of as regime characteristics—military rule, repression, demobilization, and bureaucratic orientation—but also on the composition of the dominant coalition and orientation of public policy. Hence, many scholars have labeled bureaucratic authoritarianism more broadly as a form of state or political system, not just a regime type. The broader definition has the merit of focusing attention on the links among these different elements; on the other hand, it may lump together so many attributes as to be analytically unwieldy.

As occurs with many concepts, scholars debated both the fit with the initial cases and the extension to other cases. In response to the evolving interpretations of the original four countries, analysts refined their definitions, and the question arose whether the concept really corresponded to these cases. A useful way to view this debate is to understand bureaucratic authoritarianism as an analytic construct referring to a syndrome of attributes, all of which may not be present in every case.

In the debate over extension to other cases, one candidate was Peru, which experienced institutional military rule around the same time—between 1968 and 1980. Yet many analysts interpret Peru, especially up to 1975, as a case of populist authoritarianism, owing to the scope of popular mobilization. The inclusion of Mexico was suggested in light of its conjunction of authoritarianism and technocratic policymaking. However, many scholars hesitated to include Mexico because organized labor was not excluded from the country's governing coalition and because the Mexican system during this period was not the outgrowth of an immediate prior polarization and was not a military regime.

With reference to non-Latin American cases, the concept has been applied to authoritarian Spain; to Poland, Hungary, and Austria during the interwar period; to Greece in the late 1960s and early 1970s; and to authoritarian experiences in East and Southeast Asia and in the Middle East. In these cases, many traits that Latin American specialists associate

with the original four countries may not be present, and hence the concept has served more generically to refer to modern (rather than traditional) authoritarianism that has a major bureaucratic dimension.

Explaining the Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism. Economic issues were a contributing condition in the original four cases, though not a sufficient explanation. An initial hypothesis suggested that military and economic elites established bureaucratic authoritarianism with the specific goal of promoting long-term economic and political stability, which in turn would promote the vertical integration ("deepening") of the economy, i.e., increase the domestic production of industrial inputs. Although this specific hypothesis was not well supported, the broader set of economic priorities discussed above—within which vertical integration was sometimes an element—did represent both a source of pressure, and (for some actors) a political opportunity, for inaugurating bureaucratic authoritarianism. A global process of economic internationalization reinforced these economic priorities, and hence also the incentives for this new form of rule.

Three other contributing conditions merit note. One is the demonstration effect of the opposition movements, social protests, and new alternatives on the left that arose in Western Europe, the Communist world, and the Americas in the 1960s and early 1970s. In Latin America, this demonstration effect was intensified by the emergence of socialist Cuba. The survival of a socialist state in the region dramatically extended the political horizon of the Latin American left, and combined with the larger international context of political mobilization and protest, it played a role in escalating opposition and protest in the original four countries. This escalation also fueled conservative fears of popular mobilization, thereby intensifying polarization and subsequent repression.

Second, the structure of domestic politics had an impact. Its role can be seen in the contrast between the four cases discussed above and the experience of Venezuela and Mexico. Venezuela had a high level of modernization in per capita terms, and Mexico had one of the largest modern sectors in Latin America. In light of the modernization arguments noted above, these two countries might have experienced bureaucratic authoritarianism—yet they did not. This occurred partly because during an earlier period in Mexico and Venezuela, a cohesive political center had been constituted that commanded an electoral majority and incorporated organized labor. In the subsequent period of crisis and polarization, this broad center provided a basis for stable rule and mitigated some of the difficulties experienced in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay—none of which had formed an equivalent centrist bloc. Third, in Venezuela, and in Mexico late in the period under discussion, this political resource was supplemented by an important economic resource: massive oil revenues, which gave the state greater capacity to address distributional issues and hence may have reduced pressure for the measures entailed in bureaucratic authoritarianism.

Demise and Impact. As of the early 1990s, bureaucratic authoritarianism had disappeared in South America. Various factors contributed to this outcome. First, many Latin American countries have had difficulty establishing stable, legitimate political rule and have experienced long-term cycles of alternation between competitive and authoritarian regimes. Hence, this disappearance is part of a recurring pattern, the

causes of which remain a matter of scholarly debate. Second, damaging tensions emerged within bureaucratic-authoritarian rule, for instance, between the internationalization promoted by the economic model and the nationalism of the military and of other sectors capable of mounting serious opposition. Third, severe economic problems, experienced throughout the region as part of the "international debt crisis, helped discredit authoritarianism. Finally, domestic and international protest against "human rights abuses, and somewhat later, the demonstration effect of a worldwide process of democratization, further debilitated authoritarian rule.

What was the impact of this authoritarian experience? The economic record is diverse. Notwithstanding ongoing economic difficulties, Brazil unquestionably saw a dramatic advance toward a modern industrial economy. In Chile a far more open economy was created, a transformation which a subsequent democratically elected government sought to build upon, not reverse. Argentina, by contrast, produced dramatic failures. The post-1966 government achieved initial economic success and then collapsed in an explosion of social protest. The post-1976 government imposed far more draconian economic measures and repression, yet it was unable to overcome a myriad of economic difficulties and left a deeply troubled economy. Uruguay experienced a revival of economic growth in the 1970s, reversing two decades of stagnation. These gains eroded in the early 1980s, however, owing to the combined effects of internal policy failure and the larger debt crisis.

Although the political record is likewise diverse, in two important respects the political legacies are convergent. Among substantial sectors of the population, the experience of preauthoritarian polarization and crisis, followed by the trauma of authoritarian rule, led to a greater appreciation of electoral democracy. In addition, the experience of this cycle of authoritarianism—along with the debt crisis, other economic difficulties, and later collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union—lowered developmental expectations and eroded the credibility of socialist and progressive political alternatives in these four countries. Consequently, in the aftermath of bureaucratic authoritarianism, there was evidence of greater support for democracy and a reduced likelihood of any immediate renewal of polarization.

(See also AUTHORITARIANISM; DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT.)

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