DEMOCRACY WITH ADJECTIVES
Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research

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The recent global wave of democratization has presented scholars with the challenge of dealing conceptually with a great diversity of postauthoritarian regimes. Although the new national political regimes in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the former communist world share important attributes of democracy, many of them differ profoundly both from each other and from the democracies in advanced industrial countries. Indeed, many are not considered fully democratic.

This article argues that scholars respond to this challenge by pursuing two potentially contradictory goals. On the one hand, researchers attempt to increase analytic differentiation in order to capture the diverse forms of democracy that have emerged. On the other hand, scholars are concerned with conceptual validity. Specifically, they seek to avoid the problem of conceptual stretching that arises when the concept of democracy is applied to cases for which, by relevant scholarly standards, it is not appropriate. This result has been a proliferation of alternative conceptual forms, including a surprising number of subtypes...
DEMOCRACY WITH ADJECTIVES

involving democracy "with adjectives." Examples from among the hundreds of subtypes that have appeared include "authoritarian democracy," "neopatrimonial democracy," "military-dominated democracy," and "protodemocracy."

This proliferation has occurred despite the efforts by leading analysts to standardize usage of the term democracy on the basis of procedural definitions in the tradition of Joseph Schumpeter and Robert A. Dahl.1 In important respects this standardization has been successful. Yet as democratization has continued and attention has focused on an increasingly diverse set of cases, the proliferation of subtypes and other conceptual innovations has continued. Hence, given the risk of growing conceptual confusion, the earlier effort to standardize usage must now be supplemented by assessing the structure of meaning that underlies these diverse forms of the concept.

This article initiates this assessment, focusing on qualitative categories2 employed in the study of recent cases of democratization at the level of national political regimes, with particular attention to work on Latin America.3 Our goal is twofold: to make more comprehensible the complex structure of the alternative strategies of conceptual innovation that have emerged and to examine the trade-offs among these strategies. We begin with Sartori's well-known strategies of moving up and down a ladder of generality—strategies aimed at avoiding conceptual stretching and increasing differentiation, respectively. Because this approach cannot be used to pursue both goals at once, we find that scholars have often turned to other strategies: creating "diminished" subtypes of democracy, "precising" the definition of democracy by adding defining attributes, and shifting the overarching concept with which democracy is associated (for example, from democratic regime to democratic state).

More broadly, the analysis seeks to encourage scholars to be more careful in their definition and use of concepts. The subtypes and other conceptual forms examined here are, after all, generally critical components of the main substantive arguments presented by these researchers, often advancing the author's overall characterization of the cases in question. These are the "data containers" that convey the most salient facts about the regimes under discussion.4 If one is to describe the new regimes adequately, these data containers must be employed in a clear and appropriate manner.

Improved description, in turn, is essential for assessing the causes and consequences of democracy, which is a central goal of this literature. Many studies have treated democracy as an outcome to be explained, including major works of comparative-historical analysis and old and new studies of "social requisites." Other analyses have looked at the impact of democracy and of specific types of democracy on economic growth, income distribution, economic liberalization and adjustment, and international conflict.5 In these studies, the results of causal assessment can be strongly influenced by the meaning of democracy employed by the author.6 We hope that the present discussion can serve as a step toward a more consistent and clarity of meaning that will provide a more adequate basis for assessing causal relationships.

1 Sartori (fn. 1), 1039.

4 See, for example, Kenneth A. Bollen and Robert W. Jackman, "Democracy, Stability, and Dichotomies," American Sociological Review 64 (August 1989), 613–16; and Russett (fn. 8), 15–16.
It merits emphasis that these strategies of conceptual innovation are by no means unique to qualitative research on recent democratization. They are found in many conceptual domains, both in the social sciences and beyond. A further goal of this article is therefore to advance the broader understanding of how qualitative researchers deal with these basic issues of analytic differentiation and conceptual validity.

I. DEFINITIONS OF DEMOCRACY IN RESEARCH ON RECENT DEMOCRATIZATION

In his famous analysis of "essentially contested concepts," the philosopher W. B. Gallie argues that democracy is "the appraisive political concept par excellence." Correspondingly, one finds endless disputes over appropriate meaning and definition. However, the goal of Gallie's analysis is not simply to underscore the importance of such disputes, but to show that a recognition of the contested status of a given concept opens the possibility of understanding each meaning within its own framework. With reference to democracy, he argues that "politics being the art of the possible, democratic targets will be raised or lowered as circumstances alter," and he insists that these alternative standards should be taken seriously on their own terms.

In this spirit, we focus on the procedural definitions that have been most widely employed in research on recent democratization at the level of national political regimes. These definitions refer to democratic procedures, rather than to substantive policies or other outcomes that might be viewed as democratic. These definitions are also "minimal," in that they deliberately focus on the smallest possible number of attributes that are still seen as producing a viable standard for democracy; not surprisingly, there is disagreement about which attributes are needed for the definition to be viable. For example, most of these scholars differentiate what they view as the more specifically political features of the regime from characteristics of the society and economy, on the grounds that the latter are more appropriately analyzed as potential causes or consequences of democracy, rather than as features of democracy itself.

Within this framework, we focus on a "procedural minimum" definition that presumes fully contested elections with full suffrage and the absence of massive fraud, combined with effective guarantees of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and association. However, there is by no means consensus on a single definition. Some scholars, for example, have created an "expanded procedural minimum" definition by adding the criterion that elected governments must have effective power to govern—which, as we will see below, is a crucial issue in some countries.

II. SARTORI'S STRATEGIES

We first consider Sartori's strategies for achieving differentiation and avoiding conceptual stretching. Sartori builds on a basic insight about the organization of concepts: a significant aspect of the relationship between the meaning of concepts and the range of cases to which they apply can be understood in terms of a "ladder of generality." This ladder is based on a pattern of inverse variation between the number of defining attributes and number of cases. Thus, concepts with fewer defining attributes commonly apply to more cases and are therefore higher on the ladder of generality, whereas concepts with more defining attributes apply to fewer cases and hence are lower on the ladder.


12 Ibid., quote at 186; see also pp. 178, 189, 190, 193.
DIFFERENTIATION

One of Sartori's goals is to show how conceptual differentiation can be increased by moving down the ladder of generality to concepts that have more defining attributes and fit a narrower range of cases. These concepts provide the more fine-grained distinctions that for some purposes are invaluable to the researcher. This move down the ladder is often accomplished through the creation of what we will call "classical" subtypes of democracy. Classical subtypes are understood as full instances of the root definition of democracy in relation to which they are formed, at the same time that they are differentiated vis-à-vis other classical subtypes of this concept. Thus, "parliamentary democracy," "multiparty democracy," and "federal democracy" are all considered definitely democratic (by whatever standard the author is using), at the same time that each is considered a particular type of democracy (see Figure 1). In research on recent cases of democratization, the use of classical subtypes to achieve differentiation is found, for example, in the important debate on the consequences of parliamentary, as opposed to presidential, democracy.

Moving down the ladder of generality provides useful differentiation, and the subtypes just noted play an important role in the recent literature. Yet subtypes formed in this manner may leave the analyst vulnerable to conceptual stretching, because they presume the cases under discussion are definitely democracies. If the particular case being studied is less than fully democratic, then the use of these subtypes as a tool of conceptual differentiation may not be appropriate. Analysts therefore seek concepts that distinguish among different degrees of democracy, in addition to distinguishing among different types of democracy. Because classical subtypes of democracy only contribute to the second of these two goals, they have not been the most common means of conceptual differentiation in studies of recent democratization.

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Avoiding Conceptual Stretching

Sartori's proposal for avoiding conceptual stretching is to move up the ladder of generality to concepts that have fewer defining attributes and correspondingly fit a broader range of cases. In the present context,
this involves concepts located above democracy on the ladder of generality. Scholars commonly view democracy as a specific type in relation to the overarching concept of regime. Hence, if they have misgivings as to whether a particular case is really a democratic regime, they can move up the ladder and simply call it a regime.

However, because shifting to a concept as general as regime entails a great loss of conceptual differentiation, scholars have typically moved to an intermediate level (Figure 1)—adding adjectives to the term regime and thereby generating classical subtypes to differentiate specific types of regime. The resulting subtypes remain more general than the concept of democracy, in that they encompass not only democracies but also some non-democracies. Examples include “civilian regime,” “competitive regime,” and “electoral regime.” Although scholars thus achieve some conceptual differentiation in relation to regime, they do not specifically commit themselves to the idea that the case under discussion is a democracy. A similar pattern is followed when scholars use a synonym for regime, as in “civic rule” and “competitive polity.”

Although climbing the ladder of generality helps to avoid conceptual stretching, it has an important drawback. Because these subtypes remain more general than the concept of democracy, this approach leads to a loss of conceptual differentiation. Thus, taken together, Sartori’s two strategies can advance one or the other of these goals, but not both at once. As a consequence, many scholars have turned to other strategies.

III. DIMINISHED SUBTYPES

An alternative strategy of conceptual innovation, that of creating “diminished” subtypes, can contribute both to achieving differentiation and to avoiding conceptual stretching. It is a strategy widely used in the literature on recent democratization. Two points are crucial for understanding diminished subtypes. First, in contrast to the classical subtypes discussed above, diminished subtypes are not full instances of the root definition of “democracy” employed by the author who presents the subtype. For example, “limited-suffrage democracy” and “tutelary democracy” are understood as less than complete instances of democracy because they lack one or more of its defining attributes. Consequently, in using these subtypes the analyst makes a more modest claim about the extent of democratization and is therefore less vulnerable to conceptual stretching.

The second point concerns differentiation. Because diminished subtypes represent an incomplete form of democracy, they might be seen as having fewer defining attributes, with the consequence that they would be higher on the ladder of generality and would therefore provide less, rather than more, differentiation. However, the distinctive feature of diminished subtypes is that they generally identify specific attributes of democracy that are missing, thereby establishing the diminished character of the subtype, at the same time that they identify other attributes of democracy that are present. Because they specify missing attributes, they also increase differentiation, and the diminished subtype in fact refers to a different set of cases than does the root definition of democracy.

The inclusion and exclusion of cases that occurs with a diminished subtype, as opposed to moving up or down the ladder of generality, can be illustrated with the examples of contemporary Britain, the United States, and Guatemala (Figure 2). Britain and the United States, but probably not Guatemala (at least up through the mid-1990s), would be seen as democratic in terms of the procedural minimum definition. If we climb the ladder of generality, we find that the broader concept of “electoral regime” encompasses all three cases. Lower down on the ladder the classical subtype “parliamentary democracy” would include one of the two democracies, that is, Britain. By contrast, the diminished subtype “illiberal democracy” would include only Guatemala, the case that specifically did not fit the root definition of democracy.

Figure 3 presents some examples of the many diminished subtypes that have been generated in relation to the procedural minimum and expanded procedural minimum definitions of democracy noted above. In many instances, scholars created diminished subtypes in which more than one component attribute of democracy is missing, but for the pur-

23 Because they are less than complete instances, it might be objected that they are not really “subtypes” of democracy at all. Drawing on a term from cognitive linguistics, one can refer to them as conceptual “blends” that are derived in part from the concept of democracy. However, to avoid referring repeatedly to “subtypes and blends,” it seems simpler in the discussion below to call them subtypes.

24 This subtype is understood to have the meaning explained above in the discussion of Figure 1.

25 Regarding illiberal democracy, see Figure 3. Two further points about diminished subtypes should be underscored. First, if scholars fail to identify the root definition of democracy in relation to which they form subtypes, it is difficult to determine whether a given subtype is classical or diminished.
POSE OF ILLUSTRATION WE FOCUS ON EXAMPLES IN WHICH THE AUTHOR HAS BEEN REASONABLY CAREFUL IN ISOLATING A SINGLE MISSING ATTRIBUTE. THE SUBTYPES IN THE FIRST GROUP (1A) REFER TO CASES WHERE THE MISSING ATTRIBUTE IS FULL SUFFRAGE. HERE WE FIND TERMS SUCH AS "MALE" OR "OLIGARCHICAL" DEMOCRACY, WHICH ARE USED IN POINTING TO THE CONTRAST BETWEEN CONTEMPORARY CASES AND HISTORICAL CASES PRIOR TO THE ADVENT OF UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE. WHERE THE ATTRIBUTE OF FULL CONTESTATION IS MISSING (1B), AS WHEN IMPORTANT PARTIES


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3. Partial Democracies: Examples of Diminished Subtypes

- Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democratic Developments (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 9. This is our translation of their denombranarula. In English they refer to this as "limited democracy," the same term used in 1a above, but they make it clear that their meaning corresponds to 1c.
- Edwardo Torres Rivas, "La Gobernabilidad Centroamericana en los Años 80," América Latina Hoy 2 (June 1994), 27. This is our translation of his democracia vigilada.
are banned from electoral competition, we find terms such as “controlled” and “restrictive” democracy. Where civil liberties are incomplete (1c), scholars have used terms such as “electoral” and “illiberal” democracy.

The subtypes in the final group (2), introduced by the scholars who created the expanded procedural minimum definition, provide a useful reminder that the meaning of the subtypes depends on the root definition of democracy in relation to which they are formed. From the point of departure of that definition, these scholars introduced diminished subtypes in which the missing attribute is the effective power of the elected government to govern. These subtypes therefore do not meet the expanded procedural minimum standard for democracy, although they do meet the procedural minimum standard. Examples that refer to cases where the military is seen as having an inordinate degree of political power include “protected” and “tutelary” democracy.

Diminished subtypes, then, are a useful means to avoid conceptual stretching in cases that are less than fully democratic. They also provide differentiation by creating new analytic categories. Various scholars have pointed to the need to move beyond a dichotomous conceptualization of authoritarianism and democracy and recognize the “hybrid” or “mixed” character of many postauthoritarian regimes. Figure 3 suggests that this recognition has indeed occurred, and on a rather large scale.

For countries that are less than fully democratic, however, the question arises as to whether it would be better to avoid identifying them as subtypes of democracy, for example, in cases of gross violations of civil liberties and/or severe restrictions on electoral competition. An example of such questioning is Bruce Bagley’s rejection of the numerous diminished subtypes of democracy that have been applied to the National Front period in Colombia (1958–74); these include “restricted,” “controlled,” “limited,” “oligarchical,” “elitist,” and “elitist-pluralist” democracy. Bagley instead characterizes Colombia as a subtype of authoritarianism: as an “inclusionary authoritarian regime.” Other scholars have addressed this issue by climbing the ladder of generality to labels such as “civilian,” “competitive,” or “electoral” regime, which are found in the upper part of Figure 1. A third option is to use dismissive subtypes like those noted above, such as “facade democracy,” in which the adjective essentially cancels the democratic character of the subtype. Scholars should be self-conscious about the analytic and normative implications of choosing to form subtypes in relation to democracy, as opposed to some other concept.

IV. Precising the Definition of Democracy

Another strategy of conceptual innovation focuses on the definition of democracy itself and is concerned with “precising” the definition by adding defining attributes. As the concept is extended to new settings, researchers may confront a particular case that is classified as a democracy on the basis of a commonly accepted definition yet is not seen as fully democratic in light of a larger shared understanding of the concept. This mismatch between the case and the formal definition may lead analysts to make explicit one or more criteria that are implicitly understood to be part of the overall meaning, but that are not included in the definition. The result is a new definition intended to change the way a particular case is classified. Although this procedure of precising the definition could be seen as raising the standard for democracy, it can also be understood as adapting the definition to a new context. This innovation increases conceptual differentiation, by adding a further criterion for establishing the cutoff between democracy and nondemocracy. The strategy may thereby also avoid conceptual stretching because it does not apply the label “democracy” to cases that, in light of this new criterion, the analyst sees as incompletely democratic. Although the use of this strategy may arise from a concern with adapting the concept of democracy to fit a particular context, the modified definition should not be understood as being relevant only to that context. Indeed, the modified definition can also provide new insight into other cases for which the significance of the new defining attributes had not previously been fully appreciated.


One example of precisng the definition is the emergence of the standard of an expanded procedural minimum, noted above. In several Central American countries, as well as in South American cases such as Chile and Paraguay, one legacy of authoritarian rule has been the persistence of “reserved domains” of military power over which elected governments have little or no authority. Hence, despite free or relatively free elections, civilian governments in these countries are seen by some analysts as lacking effective power to govern. In light of these authoritarian legacies, and often in response to claims that because these countries have held free elections they are “democratic,” some scholars have modified the procedural minimum definition of democracy by specifying an explicit criterion that the elected government must to a reasonable degree have effective power to rule. With this revised definition, countries such as Chile, El Salvador, and Paraguay have been excluded by some scholars from the set of cases classified as democracies, even though they held relatively free elections. These scholars have thus adapted the definition to explicitly include an attribute that is often taken for granted in studies of advanced industrial democracies but that is absent in these Latin American cases.

This revised definition has received substantial acceptance, although there certainly has not been full agreement on the treatment of specific cases. For example, in analyzing Chile in the post-1990 period, Rhoda Rabkin takes exception to the usage adopted by scholars who introduced the expanded procedural minimum definition. She argues that the problem of civilian control of the military does not represent a sufficient challenge to the democratically elected government to qualify Chile as a “borderline” democracy.

Two other initiatives to precis the definition have not received similar acceptance, but they usefully serve to illustrate the issues that arise with this strategy. The first is found in discussions of what might be called a Tocquevillian definition of democracy that includes a focus on selected aspects of social relations. In analyzing postauthoritarian Brazil, scholars such as Francisco Wefioff and Guillermo O'Donnell have been struck by the degree to which rights of citizenship are undermined by the pervasive semif feudal and authoritarian social relations that persist in some regions of the country. In light of this concern, they have precis the definition of democracy so as to exclude Brazil. Thus, Wefioff adds the definitional requirement of “some level of social equality” for a country to be considered a democracy, and O'Donnell introduces a similar stipulation. In adopting this usage, these authors view themselves as remaining within the procedural framework. Yet introducing issues of social relations nonetheless represents an important departure from earlier procedural definitions. We will see in the next section that O'Donnell has subsequently arrived at an alternative means of incorporating this set of concerns into his conceptualization of democracy.

Another effort to precis the definition has arisen from a concern that in many new democracies in Latin America and in former communist countries, elected presidents at times make extensive use of decree power, circumvent democratic institutions such as the legislature and political parties, and govern in a plebiscitarian manner that is seen as having strong authoritarian undercurrents. In the Latin American context prominent examples include Carlos Menem in Argentina, Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil, and, in the most extreme case, Alberto Fujimori in Peru. The concern with these authoritarian tendencies has led some authors to include checks on executive power in their procedural criteria for democracy and thus to exclude cases of unconstrained presidentialism. However, this innovation has likewise not been widely adopted.

Precising the definition can thus usefully serve both to introduce finer differentiation and to avoid conceptual stretching, and the associated debates have raised essential issues about the meaning that scholars wish to attach to the term “democracy.” Yet caution is in order. Among the alternative strategies of conceptual innovation examined in this article, precis in a sense introduces the most drastic change: it modifies the definition of democracy itself. If an innovation based on

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33. Authors who have employed horizontal accountability in their definitions include Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is . . . and Is Not,” Journal of Democracy 2 (Summer 1991), 76, 87; and Alan R. Ball, Modern Politics and Government, 5th ed. (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1994), 45–46. O’Donnell and Schmitter (fn. 13), 8, actually include it in their formal definition, but it appears to play no role in their subsequent analysis.
precising is widely accepted, it has the important effect of changing the definitional point of departure with reference to which all of the other strategies are pursued, in effect unsettling the "semantic field" in which these scholars are working. 34 By contrast, the introduction of a new subtype does not affect the semantic field in the same way. In a literature in which conceptual confusion is a recurring problem, the analytic gains from precising the definition must be weighed against the cost of unsettling the semantic field.

Hence, it is important that scholars avoid "definitional gerrymandering," 35 in the sense of introducing a new definition every time they encounter a somewhat anomalous case. However, the contrast between the first example (adding the criterion of effective power to govern) and the third example (adding horizontal accountability) shows that scholars may in fact impose constructive limits on precising. In the first example, the inability of elected governments to exercise effective power was seen as invalidating their democratic character. By contrast, in the third example, involving heavy-handed assertions of power by the president, a crucial point is that these presidents are elected leaders. Hence, it might be argued that it is appropriate to treat these regimes as meeting a minimal standard for democracy and to avoid precising—as long as (1) they maintain presidential elections and a general respect for civil liberties and the legislature and (2) opposition parties are not banned or dissolved (as occurred in Peru in 1992).

Finally, the initiative of precising can raise the issue of bringing back into the definition of democracy attributes that scholars previously had explicitly decided to exclude. An example is the concern with social relationships in the Tocquevillean approach. These authors could be seen as remaining within a procedural framework, in the sense that they argue that political participation becomes less meaningful in the context of extreme social inequality. However, this conceptual innovation reintroduces features of social relations in a way that nonetheless represents a major shift from earlier recommendations about which attributes should be included in definitions of democracy.

V. SHIFTING THE OVERARCHING CONCEPT

Yet another strategy of conceptual innovation is to shift the overarching concept, in relation to which democracy is seen as a specific instance—that is, as a classical subtype. Thus, although scholars most commonly view democracy as a subtype of the overarching concept "regime" (and the procedural criteria for democracy discussed above would routinely be understood as applying to the regime), some recent literature has understood democracy as a subtype in relation to other overarching concepts, as in "democratic government" and "democratic state." Hence, when a given country is labeled "democratic," the meaning can vary according to the overarching concept to which the term is attached.

A shift in the overarching concept can yield an alternative standard for declaring a particular case to be a democracy, yet without either modifying or stretching the concept of "democratic regime." As can be seen in Figure 4, scholars have used this strategy to create a standard that can be either less or more demanding. For example, a scholar who finds Brazilian democracy in the immediate post-1985 period to be so poorly institutionalized that it appears inappropriate to use the overarching label "regime" may refer to a "democratic situation." This distinction follows the example of Juan Linz's analysis of Brazil during the earlier post-1964 authoritarian period: he introduced the concept of an "authoritarian situation" to take account of the weak institutionalization of national political structures. 36 Other analysts concerned with the immediate post-1985 period in Brazil have referred to "democratic government" in order to suggest that although a particular government (that is, the head of state and the immediate political leadership that surrounds the head of state) has been elected democratically, the ongoing functioning of democratic procedures is not necessarily assured. By shifting the overarching concept from regime to government in this way, scholars lower the standard for applying the label "democratic."

Alternatively, by shifting the overarching concept from "regime" to "state," O'Donnell establishes a more demanding standard for labeling particular countries a democracy. Writing after Brazil's presidential election of 1989, which led scholars to reinterpret Brazil as having a democratic regime, O'Donnell raises questions about the democratic character of the state in Brazil, as well as in some other South American countries. He suggests that, in the context of the "neo feudalized" and at times "sultanistic" political relationships found in many parts of the country, the national state does not protect basic rights of citizenship.

34 On the problem of unsettling the semantic field, see Sartori (fn. 28), 51–54.
35 Jennifer Whiting, personal communication, suggested this term.
and specifically the rights of citizens to fair and equal protection in their social and economic relationships. This failure may not directly influence the functioning of the regime, in the sense of directly affecting the elections and associated civil liberties that are core features of the procedural understanding of a democratic regime. However, O'Donnell argues, this failure of the legal and bureaucratic institutions of the public sector to protect and promote a broader set of democratic rights of citizens is a crucial feature of the Brazilian state. Hence, although he recognizes that countries like Brazil have a democratic "regime," he excludes them from the set of countries he considers to have democratic "states." This shift in the overarching concept constitutes another way of making a more differentiated assessment of what is deemed to be an incomplete case of democracy, specifically by establishing a higher and a lower standard for democracy and declaring that these countries meet only the lower standard.

From the standpoint of maintaining a procedural definition of democracy, this innovation can be seen as a better solution to the problem that O'Donnell and others initially tried to address by creating the Tocquevillian definition. Thus, in conjunction with shifting the overarching concept, democratic "regime" continues to have a procedural definition, and this concern with the broader functioning of citizenship in the context of authoritarian patterns of social relations is addressed via the concept of the state.

To summarize, the strategy of shifting among alternative overarching concepts can serve to introduce finer differentiation by creating an additional analytic category. When the strategy is used to lower the standard for declaring a case to be a democracy, it can also help avoid stretching the concept of a democratic regime. When the strategy is used to raise the standard it is not relevant to the problem of conceptual stretching, because it is not concerned with avoiding what might be seen as the mistake of calling a given case a democratic regime. Rather, it provides additional information about cases that are accepted as having democratic regimes.

VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

We have examined strategies of conceptual innovation used by analysts of recent democratization as they seek to meet a twofold challenge: increasing analytic differentiation in order to adequately characterize the diverse regimes that have emerged in recent years and maintaining conceptual validity by avoiding conceptual stretching. Our goal has been both to make more comprehensible the complex structure of these strategies and to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the strategies. Even when these scholars proceed intuitively, rather than self-consciously, they tend to operate within this structure, which, as noted above, is by no means unique to research on recent democratization.

Yet, in the interest of conceptual and analytic clarity, it is far more desirable for them to proceed self-consciously, with a full awareness of the trade-offs among the different strategies.

Figure 5 provides an overview of this analytic structure. Conceptual innovation has occurred at the three levels of the root concept of democ-

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28 See again references in note 10.
avoid conceptual stretching vis-à-vis the concept of a democratic regime, but it does introduce new differentiation.

We have also underscored issues that are distinctive to particular strategies. Diminished subtypes are useful for characterizing hybrid regimes, but they raise the issue of whether these regimes should in fact be treated as subtypes of democracy, rather than subtypes of authoritarianism or some other concept. The strategy of precising the definition is subject to the perennial problem of scholarly disputes over definitions of democracy, as well as to the problem of imposing limits on definitional gerrymandering. Although the strategy of shifting the overarching concept with the goal of raising the standard is not relevant to the problem of conceptual stretching, it does allow scholars to introduce new analytic issues without abandoning a procedural definition of democracy and of regime.

Finally, these strategies share two common problems. First, given the complex structure of these strategies, the potential for confusion and miscommunication is considerable. It is imperative that scholars clearly define and explicate the conception of democracy they are using so as to situate themselves unambiguously in relation to this structure.

Second, this literature faces a major dilemma in the proliferation of concepts and terms, many of which mean approximately the same thing. The consequence, once again, can be growing scholarly confusion. Although new terms are created in part because scholars are pursuing these goals of differentiation and avoiding conceptual stretching, they may also be introduced with the goal of developing compelling labels that vividly draw attention to novel forms of democracy. In the literature on national political regimes over the past three decades, important analytic innovations have periodically been introduced in conjunction with the creation and/or systematization of concepts and concept labels that vividly capture important constellations of phenomena: for example, "authoritarianism," "polyarchy," "bureaucratic authoritarianism," "corporatism," and "consociational democracy." Correspondingly, the invention of additional concepts that play this same role is an impor-

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[39] For a reminder of how important vivid labels can be, one need only look at the impressive evolution of game theory, with its codification of different patterns of political interaction designated by such labels as "prisoners' dilemma," "chicken," "stag hunt," "slippery slope," and "battle of the sexes."

[40] Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in Erik Alberdt and Yip Litmanen, eds., Chau-

[41] guhes, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology, Transactions of the Westernmarck Society, vol. 10 (Helsinki: Academic Bookstore, 1964); Dahle (fn. 3); Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratiz-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics, Institute of Interna-

[42] tional Studies, Politics of Modernization Series no. 9 (Berkeley: University of California, 1973); Philipp C. Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism? Review of Politics 36 (January 1974); and Arend Li-

tant goal in the ongoing study of regimes. However, if research on democratization degenerates into a competition to see who can come up with the next famous concept, the comparative study of regimes will be in serious trouble.

Hence, we propose another major objective of concept usage, one that introduces a further trade-off vis-à-vis the two goals of achieving differentiation and avoiding conceptual stretching. In addition to pursuing these goals, scholars should aim for parsimony and avoid excessive proliferation of new terms and concepts. Otherwise, the advantages that derive from the conceptual refinements discussed in this article will be overridden by the resulting conceptual confusion.